In Defense of Pure Sovereignty
in Cyberspace
Kevin Jon Heller

97 INT’L L. STUD. 1432 (2021)

Volume 97

2021

Published by the Stockton Center for International Law
ISSN 2375-2831

International Law Studies

2021

In Defense of Pure Sovereignty
in Cyberspace
Kevin Jon Heller ∗
CONTENTS
I.
II.

Introduction ........................................................................................... 1433
Is Sovereignty a Principle or a Rule? .................................................. 1438
A. Sovereignty Defined .................................................................. 1438
B. Sovereignty as a Principle or a Rule......................................... 1439
III. Does Sovereignty Apply in Cyberspace as a Rule? .......................... 1444
A. State Positions............................................................................. 1444
B. Legal Analysis ............................................................................. 1450
IV. What Does Sovereignty Prohibit in Cyberspace? ............................ 1454
A. Tallinn Manual 2.0...................................................................... 1455
B. State Positions............................................................................. 1458
C. Legal Analysis ............................................................................. 1464
V. The Question of Espionage ................................................................ 1474
A. Is Espionage Lawful? ................................................................. 1475
B. Is Espionage Unregulated? ....................................................... 1478
C. Remote vs. Close Access Cyber Espionage............................ 1480
D. Cyber Espionage and Inherently Governmental Functions 1482
VI. Policy Considerations ........................................................................... 1486
A. Sovereignty as a Principle.......................................................... 1486
B. Sovereignty as a Rule ................................................................. 1489
C. The Problem of Ambiguity ....................................................... 1494
VII. Conclusion ............................................................................................. 1498

∗ Professor of International Law and Security, Centre for Military Studies, University
of Copenhagen; Professor of Law, Australian National University. My thanks to Luke Chircop, Russell Buchan, Przemysław Roguski, and Harriet Moynihan for their comments on
earlier drafts of the article.
The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those
of the U.S. government, the U.S. Department of the Navy, or the U.S. Naval War College.
1432

In Defense of Pure Sovereignty in Cyberspace

I.

Vol. 97

INTRODUCTION

T

he final report of the United Nations Open-Ended Working Group
(OEWG), adopted by consensus in March 2021, affirms that international
law applies to cyberspace and calls upon States “to avoid and refrain from
taking any measures not in accordance with international law.” 1 Reaching
consensus on that critical issue is a major achievement, given that the
OEWG was open to all interested Member States of the United Nations,
unlike its much smaller predecessor, the Group of Governmental Experts
(GGE). Significant differences nevertheless remain concerning how international law applies to cyberspace, because States have been unable to agree
on what kinds of cyber operations 2 international law prohibits. Instead, the
OEWG’s final report simply—and rather tepidly—articulates eleven “voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible State behaviour.” 3
To be sure, some types of cyber operations are clearly internationally
wrongful. Nearly all States agree that a cyber operation can qualify as a use
of force that violates Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter 4 or even, depending
on its “scale and effects,” as an armed attack that triggers the territorial
State’s right of self-defense. 5 Similarly, there is widespread agreement that a
cyber operation intended to coerce a State with regard to matters that fall

1. Open-Ended Working Group on Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, Final Substantive Report, ¶
34, at 5–6, U.N. Doc. A/AC.290/2021/CRP.2 (Mar. 10, 2021) [hereinafter OEWG Final
Report].
2. This article uses “cyber operation” in accordance with the definition offered by Germany, as the “employment of cyber capabilities to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace.” FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, ON THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CYBERSPACE 2 (Mar. 2021), https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2446304/32e7b2498e10
b74fb17204c54665bdf0/on-the-application-of-international-law-in-cyberspace-data.pdf
[hereinafter Statement of Germany].
3. OEWG Final Report, supra note 1, ¶ 8, at 2.
4. See, e.g., Przemysław Roguski, Application of International Law to Cyber Operations: A
Comparative Analysis of States’ Views 9 (The Hague Program for Cyber Norms Policy Brief 9,
2020) (“All States endorse the applicability of the prohibition of the use or threat of force
under Article 2(4) UN Charter to cyber operations.”).
5. Id. at 21 (“All analysed States acknowledge the right of a State to individual or collective self-defence against cyber operations amounting to an armed attack under Article 51
UN Charter.”).
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within its domaine réservé, such as the conduct of elections, violates the customary principle of non-intervention. 6
States are deeply divided, however, over the international wrongfulness
of a fourth category of cyber operation: those that penetrate computer systems located on the territory of another State but do not rise to the level of
a use of force or prohibited intervention—what are often referred to as “low
intensity” cyber operations. 7 As Michael Schmitt and Liis Vihul have noted,
because the prohibition of the use of force and the principle of non-intervention “contain thresholds that are seldom reached,” the “vast majority of
hostile cyber operations attributable to States” fall into this category. 8 Indeed, according to the Council on Foreign Relations, thirty-four States have
engaged in low-intensity cyber operations since 2005, with seventy-six such
operations taking place in 2019 alone. 9 Low-intensity cyber operations are
also likely to continue to become even more common over time, given that
they are “an inexpensive and potentially anonymous way of degrading adversaries during conflict or peacetime.” 10
Low-intensity cyber operations take a variety of forms. Extraterritorial
law enforcement is almost always low intensity because such cyber operations generally aim at obtaining digital evidence from computer systems located abroad, not at harming the territorial State or coercing its government
6. Id. at 7 (noting that “[n]early all analysed States share a widespread consensus that
the principle of non-intervention applies to State conduct in cyberspace”). There are some
minor disagreements, of course, over how to apply the principle of non-intervention to
cyberspace.
7. See, e.g., Sean Watts & Theodor Richard, Baseline Territorial Sovereignty in Cyberspace, 22
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW 771, 794 (2018).
8. Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Sovereignty in Cyberspace: Lex Lata Vel Non?, 111
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW UNBOUND 213, 213–14 (2017); see also
Watts & Richard, supra note 7, at 794 (“[T]he far more prevalent form of State-sponsored
cyber exploitation involves consequences below the thresholds of use of force or even the
coercive element required by the principle of non-intervention.”); Harriet Moynihan, The
Application of International Law to State Cyberattacks: Sovereignty and Non-intervention (Chatham
House Research Paper 3, 2020) (“[I]n practice, the vast majority of cyber operations by
states take place below the threshold of use of force, instead consisting of persistent, lowlevel intrusions that cause harm in the victim state but often without discernible physical
effects.”).
9. See Cyber-Operations Tracker, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, https://
www.cfr.org/cyber-operations/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2021).
10. See, e.g., Luke Chircop, Territorial Sovereignty in Cyberspace after Tallinn Manual 2.0, 20
MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 18 (2019).
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with regard to its domaine réservé. 11 That is true even for law enforcement cyber
operations that have a counterterrorist purpose, which are normally less concerned with damaging foreign computer systems than with preventing terrorists from accessing them or removing terrorist content. 12 A striking example is Operation Glowing Symphony, in which U.S. Cyber Command
hacked into computer systems used by ISIS in as many as thirty different
States, 13 making it “the largest and longest offensive cyber operation in US
military history.” 14
Cyber espionage operations, both public and private, are also normally
low intensity. The Tallinn Manual provides the following, generally representative, definition of cyber espionage:
[T]he term “cyber espionage” refers to any act undertaken clandestinely or
under false pretences that uses cyber capabilities to gather, or attempt to
gather, information. Cyber espionage involves, but is not limited to, the use
of cyber capabilities to surveil, monitor, capture, or exfiltrate electronically
transmitted or stored communications, data, or other information. 15

As this list of functions indicates, successful cyber espionage is the antithesis of the kind of cyber operation that would rise to the level of a use of
force or prohibited intervention. The non-damaging, non-coercive nature of
cyber espionage is most obvious with espionage that targets private corporations, such as China’s theft of intellectual property from Lockheed-Martin
in 2009 16 and Google in 2010 17 or Iran’s hacking of universities in the United
States, United Kingdom, Australia, and elsewhere between 2016 and 2019. 18
But it is equally true of espionage that is directed at governmental organs and
agencies, such as the theft of massive amounts of personal data from the
11. See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL 2.0: ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO
CYBER OPERATIONS 68 (Michael N. Schmitt gen. ed., 2017).
12. Roguski, Comparative Analysis, supra note 4, at 4.
13. See Watts & Richard, supra note 7, at 772.
14. Dina Temple-Raston, How the U.S. Hacked ISIS, NPR (Sept. 26, 2019), https://
www.npr.org/2019/09/26/763545811/how-the-u-s-hacked-isis.
15. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 168.
16. RUSSELL BUCHAN, CYBER-ESPIONAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 179 (2019).
17. Russell Buchan, Cyber Espionage and International Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CYBERSPACE 168, 168 (Nicholas Tsagourias & Russell Buchan
eds., 2015).
18. See, e.g., Moynihan, supra note 8, at 3.
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U.S. Office of Personnel Management between May 2014 and June 2015,
which was likely the work of China and has been described as America’s
“Cyber Pearl Harbor.” 19
States have adopted three very different positions concerning whether
low-intensity cyber operations violate State sovereignty. The first position,
endorsed by the United Kingdom and until recently by the United States, is
that low-intensity cyber operations are never wrongful because sovereignty
is a principle of international law, not a primary rule that can be independently violated. The second position, defended most vigorously by
France, is that low-intensity cyber operations are always wrongful because
sovereignty is a primary rule of international law that is violated by any nonconsensual penetration of a computer system located on the territory of another State—what has been called the “pure sovereigntist” approach. 20 And
the third position, adopted by States such as the Netherlands and the Czech
Republic, is that although sovereignty is a primary rule of international law,
only low-intensity cyber operations that cause physical damage to the territorial State or render its cyber infrastructure inoperable are wrongful—what
has been called the “relative sovereigntist” approach. 21
This dissensus over how sovereignty functions in cyberspace undermines the ability of States to formulate cyber policy. States obviously have
no right to engage in cyber operations that violate international law; when
they do, they bear State responsibility for their internationally wrongful act. 22
Moreover, a State targeted by a cyber operation that violates international
law is entitled to engage in countermeasures 23 against the responsible State. 24
19. Dan Efrony & Yuval Shany, A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on Cyberoperations and Subsequent State Practice, 112 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 583,
601 (2018).
20. Moynihan, supra note 8, at 21.
21. Id. at 45.
22. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts with Commentaries, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/56/10
(2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 26,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_56_10.pdf [hereinafter ARSIWA].
23. Countermeasures are “State actions, or omissions, directed at another State that
would otherwise violate an obligation owed to that State and that are conducted by the
former in order to compel or convince the latter to desist in its own internationally wrongful
acts or omissions.” Michael N. Schmitt, Below the Threshold Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response Option and International Law, 54 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
698, 700 (2014).
24. ARSIWA, supra note 22, art. 49(1).
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The lack of a settled understanding concerning which kinds of low-intensity
cyber operations are internationally wrongful thus means that actual operations are very likely to cause conflict—legal, political, and perhaps even military—between the perpetrator State and the territorial State. Indeed, at present, a State contemplating an offensive low-intensity cyber operation can be
certain that it will not be viewed as internationally wrongful and met with
countermeasures only in one situation: where both States have the same understanding of sovereignty and have articulated their understanding publicly.
Such situations are likely to be rare indeed.
This article has two purposes: to explain the different positions that
States have taken on whether low-intensity cyber operations violate sovereignty and to provide a comprehensive analysis of which position is the
strongest legally and in terms of cyber policy. The article is divided into five
parts. Part II briefly explains why sovereignty is a primary rule of international law, not simply a principle from which specific primary rules can be
derived. Part III asks whether sovereignty applies in cyberspace, as a rule,
and agrees with the vast majority of States that it does. Part IV explains and
assesses the two positions that those States have taken concerning how sovereignty applies in cyberspace as a rule: pure sovereignty and relative sovereignty. It concludes that the pure-sovereigntist position has a much stronger
foundation in general international law than the relative-sovereigntist position. Part V then analyses and rejects the most common legal objection to
that conclusion: the supposed permissibility of espionage. Finally, Part VI
argues that a variety of policy considerations also favor pure sovereignty over
relative sovereignty.
Before proceeding, it is important to acknowledge that the analysis below
has two important limits. First, the article excludes from consideration lowintensity cyber operations that take place in the context of armed conflict,
whether international or non-international. The legality of such operations is
determined by international humanitarian law as the lex specialis and requires
a separate and quite different legal analysis. Second, the article addresses only
low-intensity cyber operations that are attributable to a State pursuant to the
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.
Such attribution is necessary both for the perpetrator State to be internationally responsible for a particular low-intensity cyber operation and for the territorial State to engage in countermeasures.
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IS SOVEREIGNTY A PRINCIPLE OR A RULE?

A. Sovereignty Defined
Sovereignty is the essential feature of statehood. The seminal definition of
sovereignty was provided by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Island
of Palmas case:
Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein,
to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State. The development of the national organisation of States during the last few centuries
and, as a corollary, the development of international law, have established
this principle of the exclusive competence of the State in regard to its own
territory in such a way as to make it the point of departure in settling most
questions that concern international relations. 25

Thus understood, sovereignty has both an external and an internal dimension. The external dimension refers to the equality of States under international law, which guarantees their independence and ensures that they possess the same rights and duties as every other State. 26 The internal dimension
of sovereignty, in turn, has both a territorial aspect and a governmental aspect. Territorial sovereignty refers to a State’s right “to exercise supreme authority over all persons and things within its territory” 27 without “any form
of interference” by other States. 28 Governmental sovereignty refers to the
right of each State to freely choose its “political, economic, social, and cultural system” and determine its own foreign policy. 29
25. Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
26. See, e.g., Samantha Besson, Sovereignty, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 70 (last updated Apr. 2011), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/
10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1472?rskey=KMVIVD&result=1
&prd=MPIL.
27. 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACE 382 (Robert Jennings & Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996).
28. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Legal Implications of Territorial Sovereignty in Cyberspace,
in 4TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT 1, 8 (Christian Czosseck et al.
eds., 2012).
29. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 205 (June 27); see also G.A. Res. 178 (II), Draft Declaration on the
Rights and Duties of States (Nov. 21, 1947); [1949] YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL
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B. Sovereignty as a Principle or a Rule
The internal sovereignty of States is reflected in, and is the source of, fundamental rules of international law such as the prohibition of the use of force
and the principle of non-intervention. 30 The former captures both aspects of
internal sovereignty, prohibiting “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” 31 The latter focuses
specifically on the governmental aspect, prohibiting States—as noted
above—from coercing a State concerning matters that fall within its domaine
réservé. 32
But is sovereignty nothing more than a general principle of international
law from which specific rules like the prohibition of the use of force and the
principle of non-intervention are derived? Or does it exist as a primary rule
in its own right? This is a threshold question concerning whether certain
kinds of low-intensity cyber operations are internationally wrongful: if sovereignty is merely a principle under general international law, it cannot be a
specific rule in cyberspace.
In fact, the idea that sovereignty is a primary rule of international law is
supported by a vast amount of State practice and opinio juris , as well as by
judicial decisions and the writings of highly qualified publicists.
1.

State Practice and Opinio Juris

As Schmitt and Vihul have observed, States have routinely invoked sovereignty in a manner that makes clear they view it as a primary rule distinguishable from the prohibition of the use of force and the principle of non-intervention. 33 An example on land is Israel’s abduction of Adolph Eichmann,
LAW COMMISSION 287 (describing internal sovereignty in Article 1 as the right “to exercise
freely, without dictation by any other State, all its legal power, including the choice of its
own form of government.”).
30. See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 11–12.
31. U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
32. See, e.g., G.A Res 2625 (XXV), annex at 4, Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration] (recalling that States have a “duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic
jurisdiction of any State”).
33. Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Respect for Sovereignty in Cyberspace, 95 TEXAS LAW
REVIEW 1639, 1656 (2017).
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which Argentina denounced to the Security Council as a violation of its sovereignty. 34 The Security Council responded by adopting Resolution 138,
which affirmed that “violation of the sovereignty of a Member State is incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations. 35 In the air, notable examples include China’s claim in 2003 that the distressed landing of a U.S.
reconnaissance plane on a Chinese island violated its territorial sovereignty
(a claim the United States implicitly accepted) 36 and Pakistan’s repeated denunciation of U.S. drone operations as “a violation of Pakistani sovereignty
and territorial integrity.” 37 Finally, at sea, two incidents in which Iran detained sailors they believed had violated the State’s “sovereign boundaries”
are particularly worth mentioning: the capture of personnel from Britain’s
HMS Cornwall in 2007 38 and the (unprotested) detention of two U.S. Navy
vessels that had mistakenly entered Iran’s territorial waters. 39 In all of these
situations, the actions in question could at least arguably 40 have been characterized as uses of force, yet the States in question debated them using the
language of sovereignty.
States have also affirmed the primary rule status of sovereignty through
General Assembly resolutions and in treaties. The most notable example of
the former is the Friendly Relations Declaration, adopted by consensus in
1970, which specifically distinguishes between the prohibition of the use of
force, the principle of non-intervention, and sovereignty when itemizing the
rules of international law that govern cooperation between States. 41 Notable
examples of the latter include the U.N. Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime, which provides that “States Parties shall carry out their
obligations under this Convention in a manner consistent with the principles

34. Id. at 1659.
35. S.C. Res. 138 (June 30, 1960).
36. Schmitt & Vihul, Respect for Sovereignty, supra note 33, at 1657.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1658.
39. Id.
40. There is considerable debate about whether Article 2(4) contains a de minimis test
for the use of force, although Ruys has argued persuasively that it does not. See generally Tom
Ruys, The Meaning of “Force” and the Boundaries of the Jus Ad Bellum: Are “Minimal” Uses of Force
Excluded From UN Charter Article 2(4)?, 108 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
159 (2014).
41. Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 32, at 4.
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of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and that of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other States” 42 and the Helsinki Accords,
which contain separate provisions on sovereignty, the use of force, and intervention. 43
Finally, a number of States have explicitly affirmed that sovereignty is a
primary rule of general international law when offering statements about
how international law applies in cyberspace. To mention only three: the
Netherlands “believes that respect for the sovereignty of other countries is
an obligation in its own right, the violation of which may, in turn, constitute
an internationally wrongful act” 44; Finland “sees sovereignty as a primary rule
of international law, a breach of which amounts to an internationally wrongful act and triggers State responsibility” 45; and New Zealand says that “[t]he
principle of sovereignty prohibits the interference by one state in the inherently governmental functions of another and prohibits the exercise of state
power or authority on the territory of another state.” 46
2.

Judicial Decisions

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has consistently held that sovereignty is a primary rule of international law, not merely a principle from
which primary rules can be derived. Although the decisions of international

42. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime art. 4, Nov.
15, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209.
43. See Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe arts. 1, 2,
6 (Aug. 1, 1975), 14 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1292 (1975).
44. Government of the Netherlands, Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the
President of the House of Representatives on the International Legal Order in Cyberspace,
app. at 2 (July 5, 2019), https://www.government.nl/documents/parliamentary-documents/2019/09/26/letter-to-the-parliament-on-the-international-legal-order-in-cyberspace [hereinafter Statement of the Netherlands].
45. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Finland, International Law and Cyberspace: Finland’s National Positions 3, https://um.fi/documents/35732/0/KyberkannatPDF_EN.pdf/12bbbbde-623b-9f86-b254-07d5af3c6d85?t=160309752272 (last visited
Oct. 1, 2021) [hereinafter Statement of Finland].
46. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Government of New Zealand, The Application of International Law to State Activity in Cyberspace ¶ 11 (Dec. 1, 2020),
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Peace-Rights-and-Security/International-security/International-Cyber-statement.pdf [hereinafter Statement of New Zealand].
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courts and tribunals are not themselves formal sources of international law,
they are “subsidiary means” for identifying customary rules. 47
The ICJ’s very first case, Corfu Channel, addressed issues of sovereignty. 48
Albania claimed that the United Kingdom had violated its territorial sovereignty by sending warships through an Albanian strait and conducting minesweeping operations in Albania’s territorial sea without its consent. The
Court rejected the former claim, holding that Albania’s sovereignty had not
been violated by the transit of the warships because the innocent passage
exception applied. 49 But it accepted the latter claim because no similar exception applied to the minesweeping operations. “Between independent
States,” the Court noted, “respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential
foundation of international relations.” In the absence of an exception like
innocent passage, therefore, “to ensure respect for international law, of
which it is the organ, the Court must declare that the action of the British
Navy constituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty.” 50
The ICJ identified sovereignty as a primary rule of international law even
more explicitly in the landmark Nicaragua case, which involved the legality of
various U.S. actions designed to overthrow Nicaragua’s Sandinista government. The Court’s analysis of Nicaragua’s claims famously focused on the
prohibition of the use of force and the principle of non-intervention. But
the Court made clear that although “[t]he effects of the principle of respect
for territorial sovereignty inevitably overlap with those of the principles of
the prohibition of the use of force and of nonintervention,” sovereignty remains an independent rule. 51 The Court then relied on the inviolability of
Nicaragua’s territorial sovereignty to hold the United States internationally
responsible for providing assistance to the contras, for directly attacking ports
and oil installations, for mining harbors, and for conducting unauthorized
overflights. 52

47. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(d), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
48. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 6 (Apr. 9).
49. Id. at 27.
50. Id. at 35.
51. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 251 (June 27).
52. Id.
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More recently, the ICJ reaffirmed that sovereignty is a primary rule in
Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, in which Costa Rica claimed that Nicaragua had violated both its territorial sovereignty and the prohibition of the use of force
by using its military to dredge a river on Costa Rican territory without consent. 53 The Court held that Nicaragua’s actions “violated the territorial sovereignty of Costa Rica” 54 and thus did not find it necessary to reach Costa
Rica’s claim concerning the use of force.
3.

Highly Qualified Publicists

The teachings of the most highly qualified publicists are another subsidiary
means for identifying rules of customary international law. 55 Such publicists
have long taught that sovereignty is a primary rule. Some affirmed the inviolability of a State’s territory prior to the adoption of the U.N. Charter—and
thus prior to the prohibition of the use of force and the principle of nonintervention. Henry Halleck, for example, argued in 1861 that exclusivity of
territorial authority is a “perfect right” of a sovereign State, and “[w]hatever
one State can claim as its perfect right, it is the absolute duty of every other
to concede. To refuse it, under whatsoever pretext, would be a violation of
the positive rule and fundamental principle of international jurisprudence.” 56
Similarly, in the first edition of his seminal treatise International Law: Peace,
published in 1905, Lassa Oppenheim wrote that “in the interest of the territorial supremacy of other States, a State is not allowed to send its troops, its
men-of-war, and its police forces into or through foreign territory, or to exercise an act of administration or jurisdiction on foreign territory, without
permission.” 57
Highly qualified publicists continued to insist on sovereignty’s status as
a primary rule after the adoption of the U.N. Charter. In the 1955 edition of
Oppenheim’s treatise, for example, Hersch Lauterpacht stated matter-offactly that “the exercise of a state’s sovereign authority” on the territory of

53. Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v.
Nicar.) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicar. v. Costa
Rica), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. 665, ¶ 66 (Dec. 16, 2015).
54. Id. ¶ 229.
55. ICJ Statute, supra note 47, art. 38(1)(b).
56. HENRY W. HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 270 (1861).
57. LASSA OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACE 172–73 (1905).
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another State is an internationally wrongful act. 58 More recently, Malcolm
Shaw has specifically distinguished sovereignty from the principle of nonintervention, writing that “[t]he principle of respect for the territorial integrity of states is well-founded as one of the linchpins of the international system, as is the norm prohibiting interference in the internal affairs of other
states.” 59
III.

DOES SOVEREIGNTY APPLY IN CYBERSPACE AS A RULE?

Sovereignty, in short, is a primary rule of international law, not merely a principle from which specific primary rules are derived. The question then becomes: does sovereignty also apply as a rule in cyberspace? The overwhelming consensus of scholars is that it does. 60 Most notably, the International
Group of Experts (IGE) responsible for Tallinn Manual 2.0, which consisted
of nearly forty scholars—many of whom no doubt qualify as “highly qualified publicists” 61—unanimously agreed that “[c]yber operations that prevent
or disregard another State’s exercise of its sovereign prerogatives constitute
a violation of such sovereignty and are prohibited by international law.” 62
A. State Positions
Nearly all of the States that have publicly commented on sovereignty share
the IGE’s view. Indeed, the idea that sovereignty applies in cyberspace as a
rule was initially uncontroversial: the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts,
representing twenty States, asserted by consensus in 2013 that “state sovereignty and international norms and principles that flow from sovereignty apply to State conduct of ICT [information and communication technology] related activities, and to their jurisdiction over ICT infrastructure within their

58. 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 385 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955).
59. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 353 (7th ed. 2014).
60. Indeed, the only notable dissenters are Corn and Taylor. See generally Gary P. Corn
& Robert Taylor, Sovereignty in the Age of Cyber, 111 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW UNBOUND 207 (2017).
61. Schmitt & Vihul, Respect for Sovereignty, supra note 33, at 1650.
62. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 17.
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territory.” 63 In 2015, the GGE—then consisting of twenty-five States—reaffirmed that “[i]n their use of ICTs, States must observe, among other principles of international law, State sovereignty, sovereign equality, the settlement of disputes by peaceful means and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States.” 64 The General Assembly adopted the GGE’s 2015 report by consensus. 65
A few years later, however, the international consensus began to fray.
The United Kingdom was a member of the GGE that produced both the
2013 and the 2015 reports. Nevertheless, in 2018, the United Kingdom’s
then-Attorney General, Jeremy Wright, publicly rejected the GGE report.
According to Wright, the UK’s official position is that sovereignty is a principle, not a rule, and thus cannot be directly violated:
[A] further contested area amongst those engaged in the application of international law to cyber space is the regulation of activities that fall below
the threshold of a prohibited intervention, but nonetheless may be perceived as affecting the territorial sovereignty of another state without that
state’s prior consent. Some have sought to argue for the existence of a
cyber specific rule of a “violation of territorial sovereignty” in relation to
interference in the computer networks of another state without its consent.
Sovereignty is of course fundamental to the international rules-based system. But I am not persuaded that we can currently extrapolate from that
general principle a specific rule or additional prohibition for cyber activity
beyond that of a prohibited intervention. The UK Government’s position

63. Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (2013), transmitted by Letter dated 7 June 2013 from the Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts
on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of
International Security Established Pursuant to Resolution 66/24 (2012), ¶ 20, U.N. Doc.
A/68/98 (June 24, 2013).
64. Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (2015), transmitted by Letter dated 26 June 2015 from the Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts
on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of
International Security Established Pursuant to Resolution 68/243 (2014), ¶ 28(b), U.N. Doc.
A/70/174 (July 22, 2015).
65. GA Res. 70/237, ¶¶ 1–2(a) (Dec. 30, 2015).
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is therefore that there is no such rule as a matter of current international
law. 66

To date, States have almost uniformly rejected the UK’s position. Most
strikingly, NATO’s Allied Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace clearly endorses the
idea that sovereignty applies in cyberspace as a rule 67—a position that forced
the United Kingdom to issue a specific reservation to the contrary. 68 Moreover, nearly every State that has issued a public statement concerning international law and cyberspace since Wright’s speech has taken the same position as NATO. Three of those States—Brazil, 69 France, 70 and Germany— 71
were part of the 2015 GGE, making their affirmation unsurprising. But most

66. Jeremy Wright, UK Attorney General, Address at Chatham House: Cyber and International Law in the 21st Century (May 23, 2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-international-law-in-the-21st-century.
67. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, AJP-3.20 (ed. A, v.1), Allied Joint Doctrine for
Cyberspace Operations, ¶ 3.7, 20 n.26 (2020), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/899678/doctrine_nato_cyberspace_operations_ajp_3_20_1_.pdf [hereinafter Statement of NATO].
68. Id. at v (“The AJP refers to cyberspace operations as being, dependent on the context, potential violations of international law as a breach of sovereignty. . . . [T]he UK government does not consider that the current state of international law allows for a specific
rule or additional prohibition for cyberspace operations beyond that of a prohibited intervention.”).
69. See Buchan, supra note 17, at 184 (noting the president of Brazil’s statement that
U.S. cyber espionage is “an affront to the principles that must guide the relations among
them, especially among friendly nations. A country’s sovereignty can never affirm itself to
the detriment of another country’s sovereignty.”).
70. Ministère des Armées [Ministry Of Defense], International Law Applied to Operations in Cyberspace § 1.1.1 (2019) (Fr.), https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/567648/9770527/file/international+law+applied+to+operations+in+cyberspace.pdf [hereinafter Statement of France] (“The principle of sovereignty applies to cyberspace. France exercises its sovereignty over the information systems located on its territory.”).
71. Statement of Germany, supra note 2, at 2.
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are not, including Austria, 72 Bolivia, 73 the Czech Republic, Finland, 74 Guatemala, 75 Guyana, Iran, 76 New Zealand, and Switzerland. 77 The Czech Republic, for example, “firmly believes” that under the principle of sovereignty
“States may freely exercise without interference in any form by another State
both aspects of sovereignty in cyberspace, be it an internal one . . . or the
external one.” 78 New Zealand is more concise, insisting that “the standalone
rule of territorial sovereignty also applies in the cyber context.” 79 And Guyana flatly rejects the idea that international law protects a State only against

72. Quoted in Przemysław Roguski, The Importance of New Statements on Sovereignty in Cyberspace by Austria, the Czech Republic and United States, JUST SECURITY (May 11, 2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/70108/the-importance-of-new-statements-on-sovereigntyin-cyberspace-by-austria-the-czech-republic-and-united-states/ (“Austria has recently been
the target of a severe cyber operation. In that context, we would like to refer to the principle
of state sovereignty. A violation of this rule constitutes an internationally wrongful act—if
attributable to a state—for which a target state may seek reparation under the law of state
responsibility.”).
73. Duncan B. Hollis, Fifth Report on Improving Transparency: International Law and State
Cyber Operations 30, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.Q, CJI/doc. 615/20 rev.1 (Aug. 7, 2020).
74. Statement of Finland, supra note 45, at 3.
75. Hollis, supra note 73, at 30.
76. Declaration of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Regarding International Law Applicable to the Cyberspace art. 2(2) (July 2020),
https://nournews.ir/En/News/53144/General-Staff-of-Iranian-Armed-Forces-Warnsof-Tough-Reaction-to-Any-Cyber-Threat [hereinafter Statement of Iran] (“According to
the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction
of the states are also extended to all elements of the cyberspace.”).
77. Directorate of International Law, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland’s Position Paper on the Application of International Law in Cyberspace, UN GGE
2019/2021, annex at 2 (2021), https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/en/documents/aus
senpolitik/voelkerrecht/20210527-Schweiz-Annex-UN-GGE-Cybersecurity-2019-2021_E
N.pdf [hereinafter Statement of Switzerland] (“Sovereignty is also applicable to cyberspace.”).
78. Statement by Mr. Richard Kadlčák, Special Envoy for Cyberspace Director of Cybersecurity Department, International Law at the 2nd Substantive Session of the OEWG 3
(Feb. 11, 2020) (Czech Republic), https://www.nukib.cz/download/publications_en/
CZ%20Statement%20-%20OEWG%20-%20International%20Law%2011.02.2020.pdf
[hereinafter Statement of the Czech Republic].
79. Statement of New Zealand, supra note 46, at 3.
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cyber operations “amounting to an unjustified use of force, to an armed attack, or to a prohibited intervention,” insisting that States “must not conduct
cyber operations that violate the sovereignty of another State.” 80
The U.S. position, it is important to note, has oscillated over time. At
first, the United States seemed squarely in the sovereignty-as-a-rule camp.
President Obama’s 2011 International Strategy for Cyberspace affirmed that
the “development of norms for State conduct in cyberspace does not require
a reinvention of customary international law, nor does it render existing international norms obsolete. Long-standing international norms guiding State
behavior—in times of peace and conflict—also apply in cyberspace.” 81 The
United States also endorsed the 2013 and 2015 reports of the GGE, both of
which endorsed the idea that sovereignty functions in cyberspace as a rule.
In March 2020, however, the General Counsel of the Department of
Defense (DoD) explicitly rejected the idea that sovereignty functions as a
primary rule of international law in cyberspace, thus effectively endorsing
the UK position:
For cyber operations that would not constitute a prohibited intervention or use-of-force, the Department believes there is not sufficiently widespread and consistent State practice resulting from a sense of legal obligation to conclude that customary international law generally prohibits such
non-consensual cyber operations in another State’s territory. . . .
The DoD OGC view, which we have applied in legal reviews of military cyber operations to date, shares similarities with the view expressed by
the U.K. Government in 2018. We recognize that there are differences of
opinion among States, which suggests that State practice and opinio juris are
presently not settled on this issue. Indeed, many States’ public silence in
the face of countless publicly known cyber intrusions into foreign networks
precludes a conclusion that States have coalesced around a common view

80. Quoted in Hollis, supra note 73, at 30. It is also worth noting that the IGE conducted
consultations with more than “50 states and international organizations” over an early draft
of theTallinn Manual, and not a single State objected to the idea, reflected in Rule 4, that
sovereignty applies in cyberspace as a rule. See Schmitt & Vihul, Respect for Sovereignty, supra
note 33, at 1649.
81. WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE: PROSPERITY, SECURITY, AND OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED WORLD 12 (2011), https://obamawhite
house.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.
pdf.
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that there is an international prohibition against all such operations (regardless of whatever penalties may be imposed under domestic law). 82

Many States hoped that the OEWG, which was created in 2019 and was
open—unlike the GGE—to “all interested States,” would help clarify this
and other important international-law issues. Such an outcome seemed possible when the OEWG issued its “Pre-Draft” Final Report in 2020 because
the Pre-Draft specifically affirmed that “[e]xisting obligations under international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations in its entirety, are
applicable to State use of ICT”—a category that included, according to the
OEWG, “State sovereignty [and] sovereign equality.” 83 Unfortunately, that
optimism proved short-lived: because States were ultimately unable to reach
consensus, the OEWG’s Final Report simply affirms the applicability of international law in cyberspace without explaining how it applies. 84
82. Paul C. Ney Jr., General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, Remarks at U.S.
Cyber Command Legal Conference (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/2099378/dod-general-counsel-remarks-at-us-cyber-command-legal-conference/. This statement echoed a 2017 memo from the outgoing General
Counsel of the U.S. Department of Defense that claimed “[m]ilitary cyber activities that are
neither a use of force nor that violate the principle of non-intervention are largely unregulated by international law at this time.” Memorandum from Jennifer M. O’Connor, General
Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, International Law Framework for Employing Cyber
Capabilities in Military Operations, to Commanders of the Combatant Commands et al.
(Jan. 19, 2017), quoted in Watts & Richard, supra note 7, at 827. That memo, however, was
quickly marked “For Internal Use,” making it difficult to determine whether the U.S.’s understanding of sovereignty had actually changed. Michael Schmitt, In Defense of Sovereignty in
Cyberspace, JUST SECURITY (May 8, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/55876/defensesovereignty-cyberspace/
83. Open-Ended Working Group on Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, Second “Pre-Draft” of the
Report 5 (May 27, 2020), https://ict4peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/200527oewg-ict-revised-pre-draft.pdf.
84. See OEWG Final Report, supra note 1, ¶ 25 (“States reaffirmed that norms do not
replace or alter States’ obligations or rights under international law, which are binding, but
rather provide additional specific guidance on what constitutes responsible State behaviour
in the use of ICTs. Norms do not seek to limit or prohibit action that is otherwise consistent
with international law.”). For its part, the GGE reaffirms in its Final Report “the commitments of States to the following principles of the Charter and other international law [including] sovereign equality.” See Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Advancing State Behaviour in the Context of International Security, Advance Copy, annex, ¶ 71(b)
(May 28, 2021), https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/final-report2019-2021-gge-1-advance-copy.pdf [hereinafter 2021 GGE Report].
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Muddying the waters still further, the United States appears to have
changed its position once again as a result of the 2020 presidential election.
In marked contrast to the DoD General Counsel’s dismissal of sovereignty
as a rule in March 2020, the U.S.’s comments on the GGE’s 2021 Final Report include the assertion that “[i]n certain circumstances, one State’s nonconsensual cyber operation in another State’s territory, even if it falls below
the threshold of a use of force or nonintervention, could also violate international law.” 85 That assertion implies that sovereignty can indeed function
as a rule in cyberspace—at least sometimes.
B. Legal Analysis
The UK position on whether sovereignty is a primary rule of international
law in cyberspace is predicated on the idea that—to quote the 2020 DoD
statement—“there is not sufficiently widespread and consistent State practice resulting from a sense of legal obligation to conclude that customary
international law generally prohibits . . . non-consensual cyber operations in
another State’s territory.” 86 There are two problems with that idea. The first
is the most obvious: State practice and opinio juris are actually remarkably

85. Statement of the United States, Official Compendium of Voluntary National Contributions on the Subject of How International Law Applies to the Use of Information and
Communications Technologies by States Submitted by Participating Governmental Experts
in the Group of Governmental Experts 140, UN Doc. A/76/136* (July 3, 2021).
86. Ney, supra note 82, at 11; cf. Corn & Taylor, supra note 60, at 208 (arguing that,
below the thresholds for the use of force and intervention, “there is insufficient evidence of
either state practice or opinio juris to support assertions that the principle of sovereignty operates as an independent rule of customary international law that regulates states’ actions in
cyberspace”). Israel has questioned the idea that sovereignty necessarily applies in cyberspace in the same way that it does in the physical world, though it has refrained from concluding that sovereignty is a principle and not a rule in cyberspace. See Roy Schöndorf, Israel’s
Perspective on Key Legal and Practical Issues Concerning the Application of International Law to Cyber
Operations, 97 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 396, 397 (2021) (“It cannot be automatically
presumed that a customary rule applicable in any of the physical domains is also applicable
to the cyber domain. The key question in identifying State practice is whether the practice
which arose in other domains is closely related to the activity envisaged in the cyber domain.
Additionally, it must be ascertained that the opinio juris which gave rise to the customary rules
applicable in other domains was not domain-specific.”).
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consistent. 87 As we have seen, no other State currently adopts the UK position, and at least two dozen States have explicitly rejected it.
The second and more important problem is that there is actually no need
to find a rule of customary international law that “extends” sovereignty into
cyberspace. To understand why, we need to distinguish between specific and
general customary rules. When a rule of customary international law is specific to a particular legal or factual context, it is true that we cannot assume
the rule applies in other contexts as well—even if extending the rule by analogy would make logical sense. On the contrary, to apply the rule more
broadly, we must be able to identify sufficient State practice and opinio juris
supporting the extension. Freedom of navigation on the high seas is an example. That customary rule, Dapo Akande and his co-authors note, is specific to the high seas; it “does not guarantee freedom of navigation throughout the seas, nor does it oblige States to guarantee freedom of movement
elsewhere.” 88 That does not mean freedom of navigation could not apply elsewhere. But we cannot simply extend freedom of navigation beyond the high
seas by fiat; State practice and opinio juris would have to justify recognizing
that freedom in a new context.
The analysis is very different, however, when a rule of customary international law is general, designed to prohibit a particular kind of action regardless of how or where that action is carried out. Here we need only identify State practice and opinio juris sufficient to justify the general rule itself; we
do not have to find additional State practice and opinio juris for each specific
application of the general rule, even if the rule is being applied to a situation
that States never contemplated when they created it.

87. As noted above, at the time the UK adopted the sovereignty-as-a-principle position,
few States had weighed in on the sovereignty debate. Later rejections of the UK position,
however, have not led the UK to rethink it. On the contrary, in its 2021 submission to the
GGE, the UK again insisted that it “does not consider that the general concept of sovereignty by itself provides a sufficient or clear basis for extrapolating a specific rule or additional prohibition for cyber conduct going beyond that of non-intervention”). See U.K. Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, Application of International Law to States’
Conduct in Cyberspace, ¶ 10 (June 3, 2021), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/application-of-international-law-to-states-conduct-in-cyberspace-uk-statement/application-of-international-law-to-states-conduct-in-cyberspace-uk-statement.
88. Dapo Akande et al., Old Habits Die Hard: Applying Existing International Law in Cyberspace and Beyond, JUST SECURITY (Jan 5., 2021), https://www.ejiltalk.org/old-habits-die-hardapplying-existing-international-law-in-cyberspace-and-beyond/.
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Consider, for example, the principle of distinction in IHL, a general customary rule that prohibits directly attacking civilians. 89 That rule is meansneutral: directly attacking civilians is prohibited regardless of whether the
attacker uses a rifle, a bomb, or a chemical weapon. 90 There is thus no need
to find State practice and opinio juris for each kind of attack. It is enough that
the general rule itself is supported by State practice and opinio juris. Moreover,
because the customary rule is general, no additional showing of State practice
and opinio juris would be necessary for it to apply to a weapon that has not
yet been invented. If the weapon were used to directly attack civilians after
it was invented, it would violate the rule.
The ICJ has explicitly endorsed this understanding of general rules of
customary international law. In the landmark Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons case, the Court rejected the view—held only by a “small
minority” of States—that general IHL rules like the principle of distinction
could not be applied to nuclear weapons because such weapons did not exist
at the time the rules were created:
Indeed, nuclear weapons were invented after most of the principles and
rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict had already come
into existence; the Conferences of 1949 and 1974–1977 left these weapons
aside, and there is a qualitative as well as quantitative difference between
nuclear weapons and all conventional arms. However, it cannot be concluded from this that the established principles and rules of humanitarian
law applicable in armed conflict did not apply to nuclear weapons. Such a
conclusion would be incompatible with the intrinsically humanitarian character of the legal principles in question which permeates the entire law of
armed conflict and applies to all forms of warfare and to all kinds of weapons, those of the past, those of the present and those of the future. 91

The Court reached a similar conclusion, it is worth noting, concerning
three conventional rules of the jus ad bellum—the prohibition of the use of
force, the right of self-defense against an armed attack, and the power of the
Security Council to authorize military action in response to a breach of the
89. International Committee of the Red Cross, Rule 1. The Principle of Distinction between
Civilians and Combatants, IHL DATABASE CUSTOMARY IHL, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/
customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule1 (last visited Oct. 1, 2021).
90. Akande et al., supra note 88.
91. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J
226, ¶ 86 (July 8).
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peace or an act of aggression. “These provisions,” the Court noted, “do not
refer to specific weapons.” The Court thus held that, as general rules, they
apply “to any use of force, regardless of the weapons employed.” 92
The idea that it is unnecessary to find sufficient State practice and opinio
juris for specific applications of a general rule of international law should not
be controversial—even in the context of cyberspace. After all, States overwhelmingly agree that the basic rules of IHL, including the principle of distinction, apply equally to cyber and kinetic attacks. That position has been
taken, inter alia, by the GGE, 93 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 94 European Union, 95 and by nearly the entirety of the Organization of American
States. 96 Those rules long predated the cyber era, yet no State suggested in
those fora—or has suggested since—that sufficient cyber-specific State practice and opinio juris is required to extend them to cyberattacks.
The UK position on sovereignty in cyberspace makes sense, in short,
only if the primary rule of sovereignty in international law is limited to kinetic
activities. Applying the rule to cyberspace would then require sufficient State
practice and opinio juris to justify the extension. But that is not the case: like
the basic rules of the jus in bello and jus ad bellum, sovereignty is a general rule
that is not limited to particular means of interfering with a State’s exclusive
right to control its territory and determine its foreign policy. As the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) said in the seminal Lotus case:
92. Id. ¶ 38.
93. 2021 GGE Report, supra note 84, ¶ 71(f) (noting the applicability in cyberspace of
“established international legal principles, including, where applicable, the principles of humanity, necessity, proportionality and distinction”).
94. Statement of NATO, supra note 67, at 19 (“NATO COs must be conducted in
accordance with international law, including the United Nations (UN) Charter, Law of
Armed Conflict (LOAC) and human rights law, as applicable.”).
95. See Council of the European Union, Draft Council Conclusions 11357/13, annex
at 4 (June 25, 2013), https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST%2011357%20
2013%20INIT/EN/pdf (“Recognising that international law, including international conventions such as the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest Convention)
and relevant conventions on international humanitarian law and human rights, such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provide a legal framework applicable in cyberspace.”).
96. See Laurent Gisel et al., Twenty Years On: International Humanitarian Law and the Protection of Civilians Against the Effects of Cyber Operations During Armed Conflicts, 102 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 287, 299 n.56, 300 n.57 (2021), https://internationalreview.icrc.org/articles/twenty-years-ihl-effects-of-cyber-operations-during-armed-conflic
ts-913. The exceptions are Cuba and Nicaragua. Id. at 300 n.58.
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[T]he first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a
State is that—failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary—it
may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In
this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State
outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a convention. 97

Because sovereignty is a general rule, neutral as to the means of its violation, State practice and opinio juris do not have to establish that sovereignty
applies in cyberspace. On the contrary, the default position is that sovereignty applies in cyberspace no less than in the physical world, with the burden of proof on the United Kingdom to show otherwise. 98 That is a burden
it cannot satisfy, given that other States uniformly insist sovereignty is a general rule of international law.
IV.

WHAT DOES SOVEREIGNTY PROHIBIT IN CYBERSPACE?

The fundamental issue concerning the legality of low-intensity cyber operations conducted without the territorial State’s consent 99 is thus not whether
sovereignty applies to them but how. On this issue, States have adopted two
very different positions.

97. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18–19 (Sept. 7)
(emphasis added); cf. Nicholas Tsaugourias, Law, Borders, and the Territorialisation of Cyberspace,
15 INDONESIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 523, 544 (2018) (describing sovereignty as “a ‘catch-all’ principle which can be dissected into more specific norms but remains
the fall-back principle that captures any interference within a state’s exclusive internal and
external authority which is not captured by other more specific rules such as those on nonintervention or non-use of force”).
98. See Akande et al., supra note 88 (noting that, for general rules of international law,
“[i]t is the burden of those advocating for ICTs’ exclusion from their scope to present evidence that states, in their general practice accepted as law, have actively carved out ICTs”).
99. Because it is uncontroversial that a State can consent to a low-intensity cyber operation on its territory, this article addresses only those operations that are non-consensual.
The expression “low-intensity cyber operation” thus refers to operations that take place
without the territorial State’s consent. For sake of readability, the article will not constantly
note that a low-intensity cyber operation is non-consensual.
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A. Tallinn Manual 2.0
Although it does not have any formal legal status, 100 the Tallinn Manual 2.0,
issued in 2017, has generally set the terms of State debate over how sovereignty applies to low-intensity cyber operations. After noting that “[t]he precise legal character of remote cyber operations that manifest on a State’s territory is somewhat unsettled in international law,” the Manual summarizes
the IGE’s findings as follows:
The International Group of Experts assessed their lawfulness on two different bases: (1) the degree of infringement upon the target State’s territorial integrity; and (2) whether there has been an interference with or usurpation of inherently governmental functions. The first is based on the
premise that a State controls access to its sovereign territory, as described
above, and the second on the sovereign right of a State to exercise within
its territory, “to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a
State.” 101

It is worth examining each basis in more detail.
1.

Territorial Integrity

The IGE debated whether three different kinds of low-intensity cyber operations violate a State’s territorial integrity. The first is a cyber operation that
causes physical damage, such as “malware that causes the malfunctioning of
the cooling elements of equipment, thereby leading to overheating that results in components melting down.” 102 The vast majority of the IGE agreed

100. See, e.g., Ney, supra note 82, at 8 (“Initiatives by non-governmental groups like those
that led to the Tallinn Manual can be useful to consider, but they do not create new international law, which only states can make.”). Based on an empirical study, Efrony and Shany
have concluded that “there appears to be limited support in state practice for certain key
Rules of the Tallinn Manuals, and that it is difficult to ascertain whether states accept the
Tallinn Rules and wish them to become authoritative articulations of international law governing cyberoperations.” Efrony & Shany, supra note 19, at 585. The findings of this article
somewhat support that conclusion. As discussed below, States are quite evenly divided over
the Tallinn Manual’s approach to sovereignty.
101. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 20.
102. Id.
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that such an operation violates sovereignty. 103 The second is a cyber operation that causes cyber infrastructure in the territorial State to lose significant
functionality, such as the 2012 Shamoon 1 virus, which rendered inoperable
thousands of hard drives used by Saudi Aramco. 104 The IGE agreed that
sovereignty prohibits “a cyber operation necessitating repair or replacement
of physical components of cyber infrastructure . . . because such consequences are akin to physical damage or injury.” 105
The third kind of cyber operation is one that does not cause either physical damage or equivalent loss of cyber infrastructure functionality. The IGE
debated whether the following operations could be included in this category
of non-harmful operations: 106
causing cyber infrastructure or programs to operate differently; altering or
deleting data stored in cyber infrastructure without causing physical or
functional consequences . . . ; emplacing malware into a system; installing
backdoors; and causing a temporary, but significant, loss of functionality,
as in the case of a major DDoS [distributed denial of service] operation. 107

The IGE could not reach consensus on these kinds of operations, with all
of the Experts justifying their positions by reference to the object and purpose of sovereignty—to “afford[] States the full control over access to and
activities on their territory.” 108
As we will see, at least one State endorses a de minimis test for territorial
integrity because they believe the IGE rejected the idea that non-harmful cyber
operations are capable of violating sovereignty. But that is not what happened: because the Experts were divided, the IGE simply did not take a position on the legality of non-harmful cyber operations. 109 Failing to agree that
such operations violate sovereignty is not the same as concluding they do
not.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 21.
105. Id.
106. For sake of readability, this article often refers to “harmful” and “non-harmful”
cyber operations. Harmful cyber operations include both those that cause physical damage
and those that cause loss of cyber infrastructure functionality equivalent to physical damage.
Non-harmful refers to all other low-intensity cyber operations.
107. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 21.
108. Id.
109. E-mail from Michael Schmitt to author (Feb. 26, 2021) (on file with author).
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Inherently Government Functions

Although the IGE struggled to “definitively” define the concept of “inherently governmental functions,” the Experts uniformly agreed that a low-intensity cyber operation that “interferes with or usurps the inherently governmental functions of another State” violates sovereignty. 110 They also agreed
that, for cyber operations in this category, “[i]t matters not whether physical
damage, injury, or loss of functionality has resulted or whether the operation
qualifies in accordance with the various differing positions outlined above
for operations that do not result in a loss of functionality.” 111
According to the IGE, interference and usurpation are separate concepts. A cyber operation interferes with an inherently governmental function
when it disrupts “data or services” that are necessary for that function to
operate normally. Examples include “changing or deleting data such that it
interferes with the delivery of social services, the conduct of elections, the
collection of taxes, the effective conduct of diplomacy, and the performance
of key national defence activities.” 112 By contrast, usurpation refers to a remote cyber operation that involves engaging in an inherently governmental
function that is “exclusively reserved to another State on the latter’s territory.” 113 The most important inherently governmental function cited by the
IGE is law enforcement:
An example on point is the exercise of law enforcement functions within
another State’s borders in the absence of either an allocation of authority
under international law or consent (Rule 11). To illustrate, if one State conducts a law enforcement operation against a botnet in order to obtain evidence for criminal prosecution by taking over its command and control
servers located in another State without that State’s consent, the former
has violated the latter’s sovereignty because the operation usurps an inherently governmental function exclusively reserved to the territorial State under international law. 114

110. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 21–22.
111. Id. at 22.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 23.
114. Id. at 22–23.
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B. State Positions
To understand State positions on how sovereignty applies to low-intensity
cyber operations, it is important to distinguish between territorial sovereignty and governmental sovereignty.
1.

Territorial Sovereignty

Like the IGE, States are deeply divided over when a low-intensity cyber operation violates the territorial sovereignty of the targeted State. In general,
adopting Harriet Moynihan’s terminology, 115 we can distinguish between
States that take a pure-sovereigntist position and States that take a relativesovereigntist position—acknowledging that there are minor differences between States in each category.
i.

Pure Sovereignty

The pure-sovereigntist position is elegant in its simplicity: any low-intensity
cyber operation that involves non-consensually penetrating a computer system located on another State’s territory violates the targeted State’s sovereignty. This position obviously goes well beyond the Tallinn Manual, prohibiting not only operations that cause physical damage or equivalent loss of
cyber infrastructure functionality but also operations that involve nothing
more than exfiltrating data or installing a backdoor into a computer system.
Indeed, as the definition implies, most pure-sovereigntist States view merely
accessing a computer system located on another State’s territory as a violation
of sovereignty.
Moynihan suggests that this “open-ended, maximally protective approach to violation of sovereignty in the cyber context appears to be at odds
with the reality of states’ day to day interactions in cyberspace.” 116 Her objection, however, is overstated. As discussed below, States have often used
the language of territorial sovereignty to condemn cyber operations that fall
short of causing physical damage or equivalent loss of cyber infrastructure
functionality.

115. Moynihan, supra note 8, at 20–23.
116. Id. at 20.
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Moreover, at least three States have explicitly adopted the pure-sovereigntist position: France, Iran, and Switzerland. France’s public statement
about how international law applies in cyberspace says that “[a]ny cyberattack against French digital systems . . . constitutes a breach of sovereignty” 117
and defines French digital systems to include all “information systems located on its territory.” 118 Iran claims that “[a]ny utilization of cyberspace if
and when involves unlawful intrusion to the (public or private) cyber structures which is under the control of another state, may be constituted as the
violation of the sovereignty of the targeted state.” 119 And Switzerland asserts
that “state sovereignty protects information and communication technologies (ICT) infrastructure on a state’s territory against unauthorised intrusion
or material damage,” including “computer networks systems and software
supported by the ICT infrastructure, regardless of whether the infrastructure
is private or public.” 120
A fourth State, Guatemala, has adopted a position that borders on pure
sovereignty: “a State participating in a specific cyber operation violates a
country’s sovereignty if, in the course of a cyber attack, it takes certain information from another State’s cyber realm, even when no harm that could
affect equipment or the human rights of a person or persons is caused.” 121
This position explicitly rejects the Tallinn Manual’s harm-based approach but
requires more than merely accessing a computer system located on another
State’s territory.
Six other States have implicitly endorsed a position similar to Guatemala’s. In 2013, WikiLeaks revealed that the U.S. National Security Agency

117. Statement of France, supra note 70, at 7; see Roguski, Comparative Analysis, supra
note 4, at 5–6 (“[I]n the French view, already an unauthorised penetration of ‘French
systems’—and not the effect produced by this penetration in form of physical damage or
interference with governmental functions—is sufficient to find a violation of sovereignty.
France thus implicitly rejects the view . . . requiring more than de minimis effects upon the
target State’s territorial integrity for a breach of sovereignty.”).
118. Id. at 6.
119. Statement of Iran, supra note 76, art. 2(4).
120. Statement of Switzerland, supra note 77, at 2.
121. Quoted in Hollis, supra note 73, at 30. Guatemala’s position might be slightly narrower than France and Iran’s, given that its statement specifically mentions exfiltration.
Nevertheless, in light of its explicit rejection of the Tallinn Manual’s approach, it seems more
likely that Guatemala would view merely accessing a computer system on its territory as a
violation of its sovereignty.
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(NSA) had systematically intercepted the email and telephone communications of dozens of governments (friend and foe), international organizations,
and NGOs. 122 In response, Mercosur issued a statement on behalf of its five
members—Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela—
“[s]trongly rejecting the interception of telecommunications and the acts of
espionage carried out in our countries” on the ground that it “violates our
sovereignty.” 123 The Bahamas reacted similarly, insisting that international
law guarantees in cyberspace “the primacy of sovereignty, maintenance of
territorial integrity, [and] freedom from undue external intrusion and influence.” 124 Given that the NSA’s cyber espionage did not cause any kind of
harm to the penetrated computer systems, these statements strongly suggest
that Argentina, the Bahamas, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela subscribe to some version of the pure-sovereigntist position.
It is also worth noting that NATO appears to believe at least some lowintensity cyber operations that do not result in physical damage or equivalent
loss of cyber infrastructure functionality are capable of violating sovereignty.
NATO’s Allied Joint Command Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations says
the following:
COs [cyber operations] that generally would not constitute a use of force
or armed attack might involve effects that create only temporary disruptions or denials of service, or those intended merely for disseminating or
gathering information. . . . Depending on the context, such COs may nevertheless constitute a violation of international law as a breach of sovereignty or other internationally wrongful act. 125

Although this statement does not explicitly endorse the pure-sovereigntist position, it is closer to pure sovereignty than to the relative-sovereigntist
position discussed below. The fuzziness of NATO’s position likely reflects
122. See, e.g., Buchan, supra note 17, at 184.
123. Permanent Mission of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the U.N., Note
Verbale dated 22 July 22, 2013 from the Permanent Mission of the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, annex at 2, U.N. Doc.
A/67/946 (July 29, 2013), https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/A/67/946 [hereinafter
Mercosur Statement].
124. Quoted in Rashad Rolle, Lawyers to Act in NSA Spy Row, THE TRIBUNE 242 (June 5,
2014), http://www.tribune242.com/news/2014/jun/05/lawyers-act-ns-spy-row/. During
the most recent meeting of the GGE, Brazil reiterated its belief that “interception of telecommunications . . . violates state sovereignty.” See Statement of Brazil, Official Compendium of Voluntary National Contributions, supra note 85, at 18.
125. Statement of NATO, supra note 67, at 20 n.26.
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the fact that its members are themselves divided over how territorial sovereignty functions in cyberspace.
ii.

Relative Sovereignty

The relative-sovereigntist position rejects the idea that the mere penetration
of a computer system located on the territory of another State violates that
State’s sovereignty. For States that adopt relative sovereignty, a cyber operation must cause at least some kind of harm to the targeted state to be internationally wrongful.
“Some kind of harm” is, of course, a vague expression. Unfortunately, it
is difficult to make the relative-sovereigntist test more concrete: although
eight States have clearly endorsed relative sovereignty, they have not coalesced around a common understanding of what kind of harm separates a
lawful low-intensity cyber operation from an unlawful one. The Czech Republic seems to set the bar the highest, limiting violations of sovereignty to
cyber operations involving “damage to or disruption of cyber or other infrastructure” that has “a significant impact on national security, economy, public health or environment.” 126 The Netherlands simply endorses Rule 4 of
the Tallinn Manual, 127 thereby requiring the cyber operation to cause physical
damage or equivalent loss of functionality—a position echoed by Norway. 128
And according to Finland, a cyber operation that causes “material harm”
violates sovereignty. 129
Four other States that endorse the relative-sovereigntist position provide
almost no indication of what kind of harm is required. Germany says only
that “negligible physical effects and functional impairments below a certain
impact threshold cannot—taken by themselves—be deemed to constitute a
violation of territorial sovereignty,” 130 while the United States simply insists
that sovereignty cannot be violated when a cyber operation has “no effects
126. Statement of the Czech Republic, supra note 78, at 3.
127. Statement of the Netherlands, supra note 44, at 3.
128. Statement of Norway, Official Compendium of Voluntary National Contributions, supra note 85, at 67.
129. Statement of Finland, supra note 45, at 2. Finland also suggests that a “relevant
consideration” in determining a violation of sovereignty is whether a low-intensity cyber
operation “modifies or deletes information.” Id. It is unclear, however, whether Finland
believes that modification or deletion of information, standing alone, is sufficient for a sovereignty violation.
130. Statement of Germany, supra note 2, at 4.
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or de minimis effects.” 131 Guyana is similarly unhelpful, asserting only that
whether a low-intensity cyber operation violates sovereignty depends on
“the degree of infringement” involved in the operation. 132 And New Zealand
is the least helpful of all, noting only that “there is a range of circumstances—
in addition to pure espionage activity—in which an unauthorized cyber intrusion, including one causing effects on the territory of another State, would
not be internationally wrongful.” 133
2.

Governmental Sovereignty

In contrast to territorial sovereignty, States appear to generally agree with the
Tallinn Manual’s position that low-intensity cyber operations that interfere
with or usurp inherently governmental functions violate sovereignty. Puresovereigntist States obviously do because they believe that sovereignty prohibits all low-intensity cyber operations. 134 As for relative-sovereigntist
States, the few that have publicly commented on the Tallinn Manual’s approach to governmental sovereignty follow the IGE. Finland, for example,
says that “an unauthorized intrusion by cyber means may be seen as a violation of the target State’s territorial sovereignty if it interferes with data or
services that are necessary for the exercise of inherently governmental functions.” 135 Similarly, Guyana insists that whether a low-intensity cyber operation violates sovereignty depends not only on territorial intrusion, but also
on “the degree of infringement and whether there has been an interference

131. Statement of the United States, Official Compendium of Voluntary National Contributions, supra note 85, at 140.
132. Quoted in Hollis, supra note 73, at 30.
133. Statement of New Zealand, supra note 46, at 3.
134. See, e.g., Statement of Switzerland, supra note 77, at 3 (deeming “interference with
or usurpation of an inherently governmental function” a violation of sovereignty).
135. Statement of Finland, supra note 45, at 2.
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with government functions.” 136 The Czech Republic, 137 New Zealand, 138 and
the Netherlands 139 have made similar statements.
Two relative-sovereigntist States have also publicly agreed with the
IGE’s conclusion that governmental sovereignty prohibits a State from engaging in extraterritorial law enforcement. Specifically, the Netherlands has
said that “the act of exercising investigative powers in a cross-border context
is traditionally deemed a violation of a country’s sovereignty unless the country in question has explicitly granted permission,” 140 while New Zealand insists that the “standalone rule of territorial sovereignty . . . prohibits a state
from carrying out official investigations or otherwise exercising jurisdiction
on foreign territory.” 141 Moreover, the IGE’s position on extraterritorial law
enforcement reflects the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime
(Budapest Convention), ratified by sixty-seven States, which prohibits
“trans-border access to stored computer data” unless a State has consent or
the data is publicly available. 142 As Ghappour notes, the drafters of the Budapest Convention specifically rejected a law enforcement exception precisely because of concerns about territorial sovereignty. 143
3.

Pure Sovereignty vs. Relative Sovereignty

The practical difference between the pure-sovereigntist and relative-sovereigntist positions should not be overstated. Most importantly, both view extraterritorial law enforcement (including counterterrorism) as a violation of
sovereignty, although they reach that conclusion through different paths.
136. Quoted in Hollis, supra note 73, annex at 30.
137. Statement of the Czech Republic, supra note 78, at 3 (arguing that a low-intensity
cyber operation violates sovereignty if its interference with “data or services” has a “significantly disrupting” effect on “the exercise of inherently governmental functions”).
138. Statement of New Zealand, supra note 46, at 2 (“The principle of sovereignty prohibits the interference by one state in the inherently governmental functions of another.”).
139. Statement of the Netherlands, supra note 44, at 3 (claiming that sovereignty has
been violated if “there has been an interference with or usurpation of inherently governmental functions of another state”).
140. Id. at 2. The Netherlands notes, though, that “[o]pinion is divided as to what qualifies as exercising investigative powers in a cross-border context.” Id.
141. Statement of New Zealand, supra note 46, at 2.
142. Convention on Cybercrime art. 32, Nov. 23, 2001, E.T.S. No. 185,
2296 U.N.T.S. 167.
143. Ahmed Ghappour, Searching Places Unknown: Law Enforcement Jurisdiction on the Dark
Web, 69 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1075, 1118 (2017).
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For a pure-sovereigntist State, low-intensity law enforcement operations violate sovereignty simply because they involve penetrating a computer system
located on the territory of another State. For a relative-sovereigntist State, by
contrast, low-intensity law enforcement operations violate sovereignty because they usurp one of the targeted State’s inherently governmental functions—a type of sovereignty violation that does not require causing any kind
of harm to the penetrated computer system.
The pure-sovereigntist and relative-sovereigntist positions differ significantly, however, concerning the legality of cyber espionage. Pure sovereignty
deems all cyber espionage unlawful, because it necessarily involves non-consensually penetrating a computer system on another State’s territory. 144 By
contrast, despite their differences, the States that have adopted relative sovereignty agree the mere penetration of a computer system is not enough.
That means they all accept that cyber espionage—from installing backdoors
to exfiltrating information—does not violate international law as long as it
does not cause any harm to the targeted State’s cyber infrastructure. That is
a fundamental difference from pure sovereignty, which necessarily deems
cyber espionage just as unlawful as cyber law enforcement.
C. Legal Analysis
The pure-sovereigntist position has a much stronger foundation in general
international law than the relative-sovereigntist position.
1.

Extraterritorial Power and the Lotus Case

As we have seen, unlike relative sovereignty, pure sovereignty does not limit
violations of sovereignty to low-intensity cyber operations that cause some
kind of harm to the territorial State’s cyber infrastructure. Merely penetrating
a computer system located on the territory of another State is a violation.
144. Interestingly, France’s statement on international law in cyberspace includes a
footnote that says “[t]his document does not contain any specific analysis or treatment of
cyberespionage, which is not illegal in international law, though it may infringe such law
when linked with an internationally wrongful act.” Statement of France, supra note 70, at 4
n.2. Unless France believes that there is an exception in customary international law specifically permitting espionage—a possibility considered and rejected in the next Part—France’s
pure-sovereigntist approach would deem all acts of cyber espionage on its territory internationally wrongful, because by definition cyber espionage involves non-consensually penetrating a French computer system.
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The pure-sovereigntist position is thus based on directly applying the first
Lotus principle to cyberspace. Recall what the PCIJ said:
Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon
a State is that—failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary—
it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State.
In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a
State outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from
international custom or from a convention. 145

The argument for the pure-sovereigntist position is straightforward: Lotus prohibits a State from exercising “any form” of power on the territory of
another State in the absence of an international rule permitting it to do so;
penetrating a computer system in another State is a form of exercising power
on that State’s territory; no permissive rule of international law permits such
penetration. All low-intensity cyber operations, therefore, violate the territorial State’s sovereignty, even those that do not cause any harm.
Although the PCIJ’s decision in the Lotus case is merely a subsidiary
means for determining international law, the first Lotus principle is widely
considered to accurately capture how custom understands territorial sovereignty. 146 Indeed, even the Tallinn Manual takes the position that the first Lotus principle is customary: “The Experts agreed that a violation of sovereignty occurs whenever one State physically crosses into the territory or national airspace of another State without either its consent or another justification in international law.” 147 The Manual specifically cites Lotus for that
point. 148
The general scholarly consensus concerning the first Lotus principle is
not surprising, because it is consistent with State practice. As Luke Chircop
says:

7).

145. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18–19 (Sept.

146. See, e.g., Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came in from the Cold War: Intelligence and
International Law, 27 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1071, 1081 (2006)
(“The foundational rules of sovereignty . . . provide some guidance on what restrictions, if
any, might be placed on different forms of intelligence gathering that do not rise to the level
of an armed attack or violate other specific norms. The basic rule was articulated by the
Permanent Court of International Justice in the 1927 Lotus case.”).
147. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 19.
148. Id. at 67 n.82.
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In the context of physical space, a state’s right to freedom from interference with territorial sovereignty is strictly protected. The physical territory
of a state consists of its land, its territorial sea (if any) and its airspace. Accordingly, unwelcome state-sponsored incursions into each of these spaces
has consistently been treated as a violation of territorial sovereignty, even
where such incursions are of a low gravity. 149

In terms of airspace, for example, the U.S. DoD has noted that aerial
warfare led to the creation of “a highly restricted regime of air law in which
any entry into a nation’s airspace without its permission [is] to be regarded
as a serious violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.” 150 That
highly restricted regime is explicitly embraced by the Chicago Convention
on International Civil Aviation, which “affirms that every state enjoys complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory” 151 and
categorically prohibits all State aircraft from entering another State’s airspace
149. Chircop, supra note 10, at 21; see also Przemysław Roguski, Violations of Territorial
Sovereignty in Cyberspace, in GOVERNING CYBERSPACE: BEHAVIOR, POWER, AND DIPLOMACY
65, 77 (Dennis Broeders & Bibi van den Berg eds., 2020) (“[T]he exercise of state power is
not measured by the effects of one state’s actions on the territory of another state, but rather
by the nature of the action itself.”); BUCHAN, supra note 16, at 51 (“Any non-consensual
incursion by one state into the territory of another state violates the rule of territorial sovereignty, regardless of whether that infraction produces damage.”); Craig Forcese, “Pragmatism and Principle”: Intelligence Agencies and International Law, 102 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 67, 80
(2016), https://www.virginialawreview.org/articles/pragmatism-and-principle-intelligenceagencies-and-international-law/ (“I am not aware of any authority demonstrating that the
legality of enforcement jurisdiction depends on the scale of the physical presence.”); Quincy
Wright, quoted in BUCHAN, supra note 16, at 181 (“In times of peace . . . espionage and, in
fact, any penetration of the territory of a State by agents of another State in violation of the
local law is also a violation of the rule of international law imposing a duty upon States to
respect the territorial integrity and political independence of other States”); Stephane Beaulac, The Lotus Case in Context: Sovereignty, Westphalia, Vattel, and Positivism, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL Law 41, 51 (Stephen Allen et al. eds.,
2019) (“State power cannot be used to enforce legal rules outside its territory; the coercive
force of a state—the police or the military—cannot be exercised on the territory of another
state.”).
150. OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS 2 (2d ed. Nov.
1999).
151. Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 1, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180,
T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
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without its consent. 152 And, of course, States have routinely invoked their
territorial sovereignty to condemn even the most minor and harmless incursions into their airspace as sovereignty violations, such as Estonia’s formal
complaint to Russia when a Russian jet entered its airspace for less than sixty
seconds. 153
States also view unauthorized entry into their territorial sea as a violation
of sovereignty, even when that entry does not cause any harm. Schmitt and
Vilhul cite a variety of examples of maritime disputes being conducted “in
the vernacular” of territorial inviolability, such as the Iranian detentions of
British and American ships mentioned earlier. 154 To be sure, that inviolability
is limited by a variety of rights of passage and entry. But as Schmitt and
Vilhul note, “[t]he regimes of innocent, transit, and archipelagic passage developed as customary and treaty-law exceptions to the territorial sea’s inviolability; they modify the baseline principle that maritime borders may not be
pierced by other States.” The existence of such exceptions is specifically contemplated by the first Lotus principle.
State practice on land generally concerns abduction, which normally involves no harm. States have routinely protested abductions from their territory as inconsistent with their sovereignty. 155 We have already noted the most
famous example, Israel’s kidnapping of Eichmann in Argentina, which was
explicitly condemned on sovereignty grounds by the Security Council. A
more recent example is the U.S. kidnapping of Abu Omar from the streets
of Milan, which led Italy to insist that the United States had a legal duty to
“fully respect Italian sovereignty.” 156

152. Id. art. 3(c).
153. Estonia Says Russian Aircraft Violated Airspace Again, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO
LIBERTY (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.rferl.org/a/russia-estonia-airspace-violated/279708
88.html.
154. See Schmitt & Vihul, Respect for Sovereignty, supra note 33, at 1657–59.
155. See, e.g., L.C. Green, The Eichmann Case, 23 THE MODERN LAW REVIEW 507, 509
(1960) (citing State practice concerning abductions for the proposition that “[a]n invasion
by state agents, whether by force of arms or not, of the territory of another state constitutes
a breach of the sovereignty of that state and involves the responsibility of the state of which
the offenders are agents”).
156. Italy Tells US to Respect Sovereignty After Kidnap, THE IRISH TIMES (July 1, 2005),
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/italy-tells-us-to-respect-sovereignty-after-kidnap-1.117
9451.
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Though not State practice, the ICJ has also affirmed that merely crossing
the border on land violates a State’s territorial sovereignty. In the Certain Activities case, the Court held that Nicaragua had violated Costa Rica’s sovereignty by sending soldiers across its border even though no actual hostilities
broke out and the Nicaraguan soldiers had no hostile intent. 157 In fact, the
Court did not even find it necessary to consider whether Nicaragua was occupying Costa Rican territory, because it had “already established that the
presence of military personnel of Nicaragua in the disputed territory . . . violated Costa Rica’s territorial sovereignty.” 158
2.

Lotus in Cyberspace

Two propositions, in short, have a strong basis in international law. The first
is that sovereignty functions in cyberspace as a rule, not as a principle because it is a general rule of international law that applies to all forms of exercising power on another State’s territory. The second is that the general
rule of sovereignty in the physical world prohibits any penetration of a State’s
territory, even penetration that causes no harm.
Taken together, those propositions suggest that, in terms of low-intensity cyber operations, the pure-sovereigntist position is correct: any remote
penetration of a computer system, even penetration that does not cause any
harm, violates the territorial sovereignty of the State in which the computer
system is located. Simply put, there is no reason to believe that sovereignty
functions any differently in cyberspace than in the physical world: “the same
rules regarding violation of sovereignty apply whether the exercise of authority by the perpetrating State is carried out through a physical presence on the
territory of the affected State or remotely from outside the affected territory.” 159

157. Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v.
Nicar.) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicar. v. Costa
Rica), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. 665, ¶ 99 (Dec. 16, 2015).
158. Id.
159. Moynihan, supra note 8, at 17; see also Chircop, supra note 10, at 20 (“[T]he strongest
argument in favour of the strict inviolability approach is that an equivalent standard of territorial sovereignty has long been accepted by states in respect of physical space, and that
the content of the principle should not differ across the physical and cyber domains.”);
FRANCOIS DELARUE, CYBER OPERATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 217 (2020) (noting
that there is no reason to treat cyberspace any differently than physical territory in terms of
whether penetration violates sovereignty).
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This conclusion is supported not only by the nature of general rules of
international law discussed above but also by two additional and related considerations. The first is the ICJ’s insistence in the Legality of the Threat or Use
of Nuclear Weapons case that general rules of international law are normally
technologically neutral. When a State uses a low-intensity cyber operation to
obtain evidence of a crime, delete terrorist recruiting videos, or steal corporate intellectual property, it is still engaging in law enforcement, counterterrorism, or espionage. Only the means of carrying out those traditional State
functions are different. The idea that sovereignty functions differently in cyberspace than in the physical world is thus no more compelling than the idea
that key rules of IHL function differently for nuclear weapons than for conventional ones.
The second consideration is that, however new and different it might
seem, cyberspace is no less a territorial domain than air, sea, or land. As the
Tallinn Manual points out, “[c]yber activities occur on territory and involve
objects, or are conducted by persons or entities, over which States may exercise their sovereign prerogatives.” 160 This means that a State’s sovereign
right to protect data is no different than its sovereign right to protect brickand-mortar objects. 161 Why, then, would the general rule of sovereignty provide a State’s cyber infrastructure with less protection than its physical infrastructure? 162
3.

Are Low-Intensity Cyber Operations an “Exercise of Power”?

To be sure, the first Lotus principle applies to remote low-intensity cyber
operations only if they qualify as a State “exercis[ing] its power . . . in the
territory of another state.” One scholar, Katharina Ziolkowski, has suggested
160. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 12.
161. Chircop, supra note 10, at 17 (“The critical next step is to recognise that states also
exercise territorial sovereignty over data emanating from their cyber infrastructure. The basis of a state’s claim to territorial sovereignty over data remains physical, in that it is limited
to data that emanates from infrastructure located on its territory.”); cf. Buchan, supra note
17, at 177 (“[T]he accessing and copying of confidential information located in cyberspace,
and which belongs to entities that fall under the sovereignty of a State (whether this is public
authorities, private companies, individuals, etc), is regarded by States as a violation of their
sovereignty.”).
162. See, e.g., Chircop, supra note 10, at 23 (pointing out that “it would be curious if the
rule of territorial sovereignty provided a state’s sovereign cyber infrastructure with less protection from intrusion than a state’s sovereign physical territory”).
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in the context of cyber espionage (discussed in more detail below) that “[i]t
is doubtful whether an unauthorised ‘virtual trespass’ of or ‘virtual presence’
in an IT-system or computer network that runs on servers located in the
sovereign area of another State can be equated with a physical presence of a
spying State organ, agent etc. or a platform.” 163 Her argument, however, is
based on the idea that the “unauthorised copying of data and of necessary
adjunctive activities, i.e., amendments of data to obtain access to the ITsystems and cover the traces of any espionage activity . . . do not cause any
further, i.e. secondary, tertiary etc., physical effects in a foreign State’s sovereign area.” 164 As we have seen, the mere penetration of a State’s airspace,
territorial sea, or land violates the first Lotus principle in the absence of a
conventional or customary exception allowing it; no physical effects of any
kind are required. Mutatis mutandis, merely penetrating a computer system
located on another State’s territory, should also qualify as an exercise of
power. 165
Such “mere penetration,” it is important to note, is distinguishable from
a situation in which a State intercepts wireless signals emanating from another State without penetrating a computer system located on its territory.
That kind of interception does not violate sovereignty because the interception is not considered extraterritorial. In Weber and Saravia v. Germany, for
example, the European Court of Human Rights affirmed the legality of a
program in which “[s]ignals emitted from foreign countries are monitored
by interception sites situated on German soil.” 166 The Court held that such
“strategic monitoring measures” did not violate Uruguay’s territorial sovereignty because they involved “international wireless telecommunications,
163. Katharina Ziolkowski, Peacetime Cyber Espionage: New Tendencies in International Law,
in PEACETIME REGIME FOR STATE ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE: INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY 425, 458–59 (Katharina Ziolkowski ed., 2013).
164. Id. at 459.
165. See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Chasing Bits Across Borders, 2001 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
LEGAL FORUM 35, 77 (rejecting the argument that “a remote search is less invasive than a
physical search” because “[i]f the sovereignty interest at issue is the target state’s power to
protect persons and property within its borders, it does not matter whether interference
with that power comes from inside or outside of the target state”); Moynihan, supra note 8,
at 19–20 (“There seems to be no reason in principle to distinguish physical violations (i.e.
activity carried out by a state agent physically on the territory of the victim state) and remote
violations (i.e. activity carried out from outside the affected state’s territory).”).
166. Weber and Saravia v. Germany, No. 54934/00, ¶ 88 (2006) (ECtHR), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-76586.

1470

In Defense of Pure Sovereignty in Cyberspace

Vol. 97

that is, telecommunications which are not effected via fixed telephone
lines but, for example, via satellite or radio relay links.” 167 Similarly, in X (Re),
the Federal Court of Canada approved a Canadian Secret Intelligence Service
(CSIS) plan “to use listening posts within Canada to intercept communications emanating from foreign territory.” 168 The Court acknowledged that it
had relied on the concept of territorial sovereignty two years earlier to invalidate a CSIS program that permitted “covert electronic surveillance” of Canadians living abroad. But it found the listening-post plan to be materially
different from the earlier program because it would involve not “a warrant
that authorizes activities abroad but one which authorizes investigative activities to be conducted in Canada which will allow for communications to
be listened to and information obtained from Canada.” 169
These kinds of cyber operations—which also include using spy satellites
to intercept wireless signals 170—do not violate territorial sovereignty for two
reasons: (1) the State agents intercepting the information are located outside
of the targeted State; and (2) the interception does not require accessing
cyber infrastructure located on the targeted State’s territory. A low-intensity
cyber operation satisfies (1) but not (2): although the operation is conducted
remotely, obtaining the information requires accessing computer systems located on the territory of the targeted State. 171 Such low-intensity cyber operations thus involve precisely the “exercise [of] power . . . in the territory of
another state” that the first Lotus principle prohibits. 172
167. Id.
168. BUCHAN, supra note 16, at 58.
169. X (Re), 2009 FC 1058, [2010] 1 F.C.R. 460, ¶ 40 (Can.).
170. See, e.g., Chesterman, supra note 146, at 108.
171. See, e.g., Ziolkowski, supra note 163, at 429 (arguing that cyber-espionage does not
include “electronic reconnaissance and surveillance methods . . . using, for example, satellites, long-range cameras and acoustic devices, as such methods do not include copying of
data from IT-systems or computer networks”).
172. See, e.g., Sean Watts, Low-Intensity Cyber Operations and the Principle of Non-Intervention,
14 BALTIC YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 137, 145 (2017) (“[I]t could well be argued
that the intrusion by US officials into data stored on servers located on German soil amounts
to a violation of Germany’s territorial sovereignty because they are hereby, albeit remotely,
exercising US governmental authority on German territory without German consent.”); Patrick C.R. Terry, “Don’t Do as I Do”—The US Response to Russian and Chinese Cyber Espionage
and Public International Law, 19 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 613, 617 (2018) (noting that “the
intrusion of Russian and/or Chinese government officials into data stored on servers located on US soil violated the US’s territorial sovereignty,” despite being conducted remotely,
“because it is sufficient that the foreign government’s intrusive activities occurred on US
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This analysis is supported by the Tallinn Manual itself. The Manual specifically distinguishes between remote cyber operations that simply intercept
wireless signals and remote cyber operations that involve accessing computer
systems located on the territory of another State. In the IGE’s view, the former cannot violate sovereignty “because the cyber operation does not manifest in cyber infrastructure on the target State’s territory.” 173 By contrast, the
latter at least potentially violate sovereignty because such operations do territorially manifest. 174 In other words, the IGE does not deny that low-intensity cyber operations are an “exercise [of] power . . . in the territory of another state.” Instead, it suggests—wrongly, as argued above—that the “precise legal character” of such operations “is somewhat unsettled in international law.” 175
The idea that the remote penetration of a computer system involves exercising power on the territory of the targeted State is also reflected in the
Manual’s distinction between public and private data. According to the IGE,
intercepting data is territorial, not extraterritorial, “so long as the data is
meant to be accessible” from the State doing the intercepting. 176 That means
there can be no violation of sovereignty if data stored abroad is either publicly available on the internet or is not meant to be publicly available but is
nevertheless accessible from the intercepting State with the requisite passwords. 177 By contrast, intercepting data is extraterritorial—manifesting on
the targeted State’s territory—if the data is both stored privately and is meant
to be accessible only from the targeted State’s territory:
Such cases must be distinguished from those in which data is not meant to
be made available to individuals in the State. An example would be data
that is stored on a private computer abroad, even if connected to the Internet, that is not meant to be accessible. Thus, as an example, if a law
enforcement agency hacks into a suspected criminal’s computer located in
territory”); Roguski, Violations of Territorial Sovereignty, supra note 149, at 75 (“If the agents of
a state perform cyber operations within the cyber infrastructure of another state in ways
other than the intended use of said cyber infrastructure, that is, by violating the information
security of computer systems, they exercise state power vis-à-vis cyber infrastructure under
the jurisdiction of another state.”).
173. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 19–20.
174. Id. at 20.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 69–70.
177. Id.
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another State, it is exercising enforcement jurisdiction in that State and the
activity requires the latter State’s consent or a specific allocation of authority under international law. 178

The Budapest Convention adopts a similar test for determining whether
intercepting data is territorial or extraterritorial. Article 32 of the Convention
provides that “[a] Party may, without the authorisation of another Party . . .
access publicly available (open source) stored computer data, regardless of
where the data is located geographically.” Accessing data that is not publicly
available, by contrast, is an extraterritorial exercise of power that requires
authorization by the territorial State. 179
4.

Does a Permissive Rule Apply to Low-Intensity Cyber Operations?

Because remotely penetrating a computer system involves the “exercise [of]
power . . . in the territory of another state,” all low-intensity cyber operations
violate the first Lotus principle unless there is either a conventional or customary rule that permits such penetration. Moreover, as the Tallinn Manual
notes, “[a]llocation of extraterritorial enforcement authority under treaty and
customary international law must be explicit, that is, it may not be implied
on the basis of other rules of general international law.” 180
There are numerous conventional rules that explicitly permit States, on
an exceptional basis, to violate another State’s territorial sovereignty. Two
obvious examples are Article 17 of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, which provides that, “[s]ubject to this Convention, ships of
all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage
through the territorial sea,” 181 and Article 25 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, which permits a State to provide assistance to a distressed civilian airplane in another State’s territory. 182
By contrast, no convention explicitly or even implicitly permits States to
engage in low-intensity cyber operations on the territory of another State as
long as they are not harmful. On the contrary, the Budapest Convention
suggests that States view the mere penetration of a computer system located
178. Id. at 70.
179. Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 142, art. 32(a).
180. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 67.
181. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 17, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397.
182. Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 151, art. 25.
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on another State’s territory as a violation of their sovereignty. Article 2 thus
requires each State party to criminalize, “when committed intentionally, the
access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right.”
There is also no persuasive argument that customary international law
imposes a de minimis test on low-intensity cyber operations that it does not
impose on physical violations of territorial sovereignty. Even if we don’t
count ratifications of the Budapest Convention as evidence to the contrary, 183 the State practice discussed above indicates that, at best, States are
nearly equally divided between the pure-sovereigntist and relative-sovereigntist positions. That is far from the “general practice” that the creation of a
customary cyber exception to the first Lotus principle requires.
Because there is no conventional or customary exception to the first Lotus principle in cyberspace, the pure-sovereigntist position is correct: all lowintensity cyber operations violate the sovereignty of the territorial State because sovereignty prohibits any exercise of power, no matter how minimal
or harmless, on another State’s territory. Indeed, given that States almost
universally accept that sovereignty applies in cyberspace as a rule, not a principle, that is not a difficult conclusion to reach. 184
V.

THE QUESTION OF ESPIONAGE

As noted earlier, despite some members of the IGE defending the puresovereigntist position, the Tallinn Manual states that “[t]he precise legal character of remote cyber operations that manifest on a State’s territory is somewhat unsettled in international law.” 185 The IGE’s reluctance to endorse pure
sovereignty appears to be based on the supposed lawfulness of espionage
under international law: given the nature of general rules, if sovereignty does

183. The ILC Draft Conclusions on the Identification of Customary International Law
contemplate the ratification of treaties qualifying, in certain circumstances, as opinio juris. See
International Law Commission, Report on the Work of Its Sixty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc.
A/69/10, at 205 (Draft Conclusion 10(2)) (2014).
184. Watts & Richard, supra note 7, at 834; see also Schmitt & Vihul, Respect for Sovereignty,
supra note 33, at 1670 (“Practice and opinio juris—and perhaps treaty law—will not determine
whether territorial sovereignty is inviolable; it clearly is. Rather, practice and opinio juris will
inform the contours of the rule as applied in the cyber context. Over time, it may even
contribute to the emergence of lex specialis rules that provide for exceptions to the lex generalis rule protecting territorial integrity and inviolability. But for the present, such possibilities amount to nothing more than lex ferenda.”).
185. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 20.
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not prohibit espionage in the physical world, there is no reason to assume it
prohibits espionage in cyberspace.
The espionage argument takes two very different forms: (1) espionage is
affirmatively permitted by international law, and (2) international law does
not regulate espionage, so it is neither affirmatively lawful nor affirmatively
unlawful. Neither argument is persuasive.
A. Is Espionage Lawful?
A minority of scholars make the more assertive claim that State practice and
opinio juris have created a customary exception to territorial sovereignty that
permits States to engage in espionage, whether kinetic or cyber. According
to Jeffrey Smith, for example, “because espionage is such a fixture in international affairs, it is fair to say that the practice of states recognizes espionage
as a legitimate function of the state, and therefore it is legal as a matter of
customary international law. 186 Similarly, Gary Brown and Keira Poellet argue that “[y]ears of state practice accepting violations of territorial sovereignty for the purpose of espionage have apparently led to the establishment
of an exception to traditional rules of sovereignty—a new norm seems to
have been created.” 187
That argument, however, suffers from a glaring problem: although many
States engage in espionage in both the physical world and cyberspace, they
rarely—if ever—argue that international law affirmatively entitles them to
do so. 188 The creation of customary international law requires both State
186. Jeffrey H. Smith, Symposium: State Intelligence Gathering and International Law: Keynote
Address, 28 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 543, 544 (2007).
187. Gary Brown & Keira Poellet, The Customary International Law of Cyberspace, 6 STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY 126, 134 (2012); see also WALTER GARY SHARP, CYBERSPACE
AND THE USE OF FORCE 123 (1999) (arguing with regard to espionage that State practice
“specifically recognizes a right to engage as an inherent part of foreign relations”).
188. See, e.g., BUCHAN, supra note 16, at 162 (noting that, although “on rare occasions
states have publicly acknowledged their espionage activities and, in doing so, have sought
to provide justifications for this conduct. . . . these states have steadfastly refused to justify
their conduct on the basis that it is lawful under customary international law”); Pål Wrange,
Intervention in National and Private Cyberspace and International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY: LIBER AMICORUM SAID MAHMOUDI 307, 321
(Jonas Ebbesson et al. eds., 2014) (“I know of no state that has publicly claimed that espionage in all its forms is legal. On the contrary, states generally deny being involved in illegal
espionage, and admit only when there is full proof.”).
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practice and opinio juris; State practice is not enough. 189 The brute fact that
espionage is commonplace is thus incapable of creating a customary exception to territorial sovereignty. 190
Moreover, in marked contrast to States’ silence concerning the legality
of espionage, numerous States have denounced espionage as internationally
unlawful—opinio juris that cuts precisely the other way. A particularly powerful example is Mercosur’s five-party statement “strongly rejecting the
[NSA’s] interception of telecommunications and the acts of espionage carried out in our countries” on the ground that such “unacceptable behaviour
. . . violates our sovereignty.” 191 Mexico, 192 Indonesia, 193 and the Bahamas 194
took similar positions on the NSA’s spying. An older example is the international reaction to the Soviet Union’s discovery in 1960 that the United States
189. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), Judgment,
1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶77 (Feb. 20) (“Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice,
but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that
this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.”). Interestingly, Innaki Navarrete and Russell Buchan claim that the widespread use of espionage does
not even satisfy the State practice element of custom, because “[s]tate practice must be public in character to inform the development of CIL.” Inaki Navarrette & Russell Buchan, Out
of the Legal Wilderness: Peacetime Espionage, International Law, and the Existence of Customary Exceptions, 51 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 897, 919 (2019).
190. See, e.g., Craig Forcese, Spies Without Borders: International Law and Intelligence Collection,
5 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND POLICY 179, 202 (2011) (“Even if it is commonplace, spying is a poor candidate for a customary international law exception to sovereignty—whatever state practice exists in the area is hardly accompanied by opinio juris.”);
BUCHAN, supra note 16, at 156–57 (“[E]ven though it may be ‘an open secret that countries
spy on friends and foes alike’, non-acknowledgment of their participation in this activity
precludes the formation of state practice of the requisite quality to influence the shape and
content of customary law.”); Ziolkowski, supra note 163, at 442 (“In contrast to the assertions of some legal commentators, the consistent State practice of espionage activities and
the lack of opinio iuris on its illegality do not constitute the practice’s (positive) legality.”).
Some States have domestic legislation that authorizes foreign espionage. See, e.g., TALLINN
MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 169 (citing Sweden, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Austria). Such legislation does not contribute to a customary exception, however,
unless it includes or is accompanied by a statement that international law permits espionage.
States are obviously entitled to authorize actions that violate international law.
191. Mercosur Statement, supra note 123, at 2.
192. BUCHAN, supra note 16, at 164.
193. Id. at 55.
194. Id. at 54 (“The Bahamas wishes to underscore . . . that international law is the
standard of conduct of States, [and protects] the primacy of sovereignty, [the] maintenance
of territorial integrity, [and] freedom from undue external intrusion and influence.”).
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had been using reconnaissance aircraft to spy on it from within its airspace.
The U.S.’s espionage was condemned as a violation of sovereignty not only
by the Soviet Union but also by Poland, Tunisia, and Ceylon (now Sri
Lanka). 195 A complete survey of such contrary opinio juris is beyond the scope
of this article, but Ian Brown and Douwe Korff’s conclusion about espionage and customary international law seems well-justified:
It is quite clear from the strong protests against transnational surveillance,
as expressed both by individual states in Europe, South America and elsewhere, and by major intergovernmental bodies and fora such as the UN
General Assembly, the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and
Commission, that opinio juris, if anything, is on the opposite side: that it is a
principle of public international law, confirmed in international customary
law, that transnational collection of data from a country without that country’s consent, for either law enforcement or national security purposes, is
unlawful. 196

This conclusion, it is worth noting, is supported by the fact that most
States criminalize espionage conducted on their territory, because such criminalization indicates that they do not view espionage as affirmatively permitted by international law. 197 Catherine Lotrionte has argued that such domestic laws are irrelevant to the legality of cyber espionage because “[t]he criminalization of such methods . . . is distinct from intelligence collection per se
being unlawful under international law.” 198 But that is not correct: if customary international law affirmatively permitted espionage, a State would commit a wrongful act by prosecuting a foreign national for engaging in espionage on its territory. 199 This is the second Lotus principle, which holds that,
for actions that take place on its own territory, “all that can be required of a
State is that it should not overstep the limits which international law places
upon its jurisdiction; within these limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests

195. Id. at 164.
196. Ian Brown & Douwe Korff, Foreign Surveillance: Law and Practice in a Global Digital
Environment, 3 EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 243, 250 (2014).
197. See, e.g., Catherine Lotrionte, Countering State-Sponsored Cyber Economic Espionage under
International Law, 40 NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 443, 479 (2014).
198. Id. at 481.
199. The spy would also presumably be entitled to immunity ratione materiae in the domestic prosecution, as she was acting lawfully on behalf of her State.
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in its sovereignty.” 200 In other words, because international law is superior to
domestic law, a State cannot prohibit what international law specifically permits. A useful analogy is the combatant’s privilege to kill in an international
armed conflict. That privilege is specifically guaranteed by international humanitarian law, 201 so it would be internationally wrongful for a State to bring
murder charges against an enemy soldier who killed in the heat of battle.
B. Is Espionage Unregulated?
The weakness of the idea that espionage is affirmatively permitted by international law likely explains why most scholars, including the IGE, 202 take the
position that espionage is simply unregulated by international law—neither
permitted nor prohibited. Edwin Djabatey’s argument is the most legally precise:
It is worth noting that cyber espionage itself, that is, the collection of information vital to the protection of the State, does not breach international
law irrespective of whether it is conducted for economic purposes or for
more traditional military/political purposes. International law is generally
silent on the permissibility of States collecting intelligence on each other.
This is due to widespread acceptance that all States engage in it to some
degree. Generally, those matters that international law does not regulate are
left to States’ domestic legal orders to regulate (the Lotus case). 203
200. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19 (Sept. 7).
201. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 43(2), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3.
202. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 169.
203. Edwin Djabatey, U.S. Offensive Cyber Operations against Economic Cyber Intrusions: An
International Law Analysis – Part I, JUST SECURITY (July 11, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/64875/u-s-offensive-cyber-operations-against-economic-cyber-intrusions-an-international-law-analysis-part-i/; see also Gary Brown, Spying and Fighting in Cyberspace: Which is
Which?, 8 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND POLICY 621, 622 (2016) (“Espionage
has been considered unregulated under the international legal system—meaning cyber activities that constitute espionage are neither lawful nor unlawful under international law.”);
Moynihan, supra note 8, at 45 (“[T]he majority position among commentators is that with
the exception of certain rules, espionage is largely left unregulated by international law and
as such is not prohibited by international law per se. Many commentators argue that this
approach also applies in the cyber context.”); Chircop, supra note 10, at 14 (“[T]he weight
of authority . . . currently favours the view that cyber espionage is not per se prohibited
under international law.”).
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This position has the advantage of making the widespread domestic
criminalization of espionage irrelevant to whether international law prohibits
committing espionage on the territory of another State. If the baseline position is that espionage is unregulated by international law, the fact that States
choose to criminalize espionage domestically does not count—at least without more—as either State practice or opinio juris toward a customary rule prohibiting its extraterritorial commission.
Notably, the U.S. DoD has made precisely this argument:
Of course, most countries, including the United States, have domestic laws
against espionage, but international law, in our view, does not prohibit espionage per se even when it involves some degree of physical or virtual
intrusion into foreign territory. There is no anti-espionage treaty, and there
are many concrete examples of States practicing it, indicating the absence
of a customary international law norm against it. 204

The DoD argument assumes that extraterritorial espionage is lawful as
long as it is not specifically prohibited by a customary rule. But that idea is
based (as the quote from Djabatey indicates) on the second Lotus principle,
which applies only to legislative and adjudicative jurisdiction. The relevant
paragraph from Lotus is worth quoting at length:
It does not . . . follow that international law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which relates to
acts which have taken place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some
permissive rule of international law. Such a view would only be tenable if
international law contained a general prohibition to States to extend the
application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons,
property and acts outside their territory, and if, as an exception to this general prohibition, it allowed States to do so in certain specific cases. But this
is certainly not the case under international law as it stands at present. Far
from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not
extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to
persons, property and acts outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion, which is only limited in certain cases by
prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt
the principles which it regards as best and most suitable. 205
204. Ney, supra note 82, at 11–12.
205. S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19.
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As the quote makes clear, the second Lotus principle is that States are
free to apply their laws to acts committed outside of their territory unless a
rule of customary international law specifically prohibits them from doing
so. That principle, however, does not extend to extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction—where a State exercises power on the territory of another State.
That is the domain of the first Lotus principle, which (again) provides that
“the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State
is that—failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary—it may not
exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense,
jurisdiction is certainly territorial.” 206
It seems self-evident that, like remote cyber operations generally, remote
cyber espionage represents “the exercise of power” on the territory of another State. After all, remote cyber espionage is simply a type of remote lowintensity cyber operation, one distinguished from other types—particularly
law enforcement —solely by its purpose. In terms of territorial sovereignty,
that is a distinction without a difference. As Pål Wrange notes, nothing in
international law suggests that “measures undertaken for security and intelligence purposes should be treated differently from measures undertaken to
punish and prevent crime.” 207 We have already seen that States, scholars, and
even the IEG agree that sovereignty categorically prohibits extraterritorial
law enforcement in the absence of the territorial State’s consent. States are
thus equally prohibited from committing espionage on the territory of another State “except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international
custom or from a convention” 208—and no such permissive rule exists.
C. Remote vs. Close Access Cyber Espionage
The Tallinn Manual rejects this analysis, of course, insisting that remote cyber
espionage does not violate the targeted State’s territorial sovereignty unless
it causes physical damage or the equivalent loss of cyber infrastructure functionality. Indeed, the Manual goes so far as to specifically distinguish between
non-harmful remote cyber espionage and non-harmful “close-access” cyber
espionage, in which the cyber operation is initiated by a State agent who is
physically present on the territory of the targeted State. According to the
Manual, only the latter violates the targeted State’s territorial sovereignty:
206. Id. at 18–19.
207. Wrange, supra note 188, at 320.
208. S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19.
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Neither could the Experts agree on the lawfulness of close access cyber
espionage operations, such as the insertion of a USB flash drive into a computer located on one State’s territory by an individual acting under the direction or control (Rule 17) of another State. The majority viewed such
activity as a violation of sovereignty, not because cyber espionage is involved, but rather by virtue of the fact that the individual is on another
State’s territory while non-consensually engaging in the operation. 209

This is a curious and indefensible distinction. It is obviously based on
the idea that remote cyber espionage—unlike close-access cyber espionage—does not involve non-consensual presence on another State’s territory. But that idea makes little logical sense, given that the penetrated computer system is physically located on the territory of the targeted State in
both situations. 210 Moreover, it is inconsistent with the IGE’s own belief,
discussed earlier, that cyber operations “manifest on a State’s territory” when
they involve accessing non-public data that is stored on a computer system
located in another State. 211 Remote cyber espionage targets non-public data
almost by definition. 212
There is, in short, no legally relevant difference between remote and
close-access cyber espionage: either both violate sovereignty or neither does.
Interestingly, at least a few members of the IGE acknowledged the need for
symmetry between the two types of espionage, claiming that both are lawful
because “extensive State practice of conducting espionage on the target
State’s territory has created an exception to the generally accepted premise
that non-consensual activities attributable to a State while physically present
on another’s territory violate sovereignty.” 213 That position is coherent, unlike the position taken by the IGE majority. But it is legally meritless: as we
209. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 171. At least one State, the Czech Republic, agrees. See Roguski, Importance of New Statements, supra note 72.
210. Cf. Roguski, Importance of New Statements, supra note 72 (“It is not clear why a closeaccess cyber operation resulting in the installation of malware on a computer in the targeted
State should be regarded as a violation of that State’s sovereignty, while a remote-access
cyber operation producing exactly the same result should not.”); see also BUCHAN, supra note
16, at 54 (“[T]he Tallinn Manual 2.0 does not explain why the majority of the Experts considered close access cyber espionage to be unlawful as soon as the responsible state intrudes
into the physical territory of the victim state (and regardless of whether that operation causes
damage or harm), but remote access cyber espionage that trespasses upon another state’s
cyber infrastructure is lawful (unless it gives rise to damage or harm.”).
211. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 20.
212. See, e.g., id. at 168.
213. Id. at 19.
1481

International Law Studies

2021

have seen, opinio juris in support of a customary exception for espionage,
physical or cyber, is completely lacking.
D. Cyber Espionage and Inherently Governmental Functions
The Tallinn Manual appears to recognize that limiting violations of sovereignty to cyber operations that cause physical damage or equivalent loss of
cyber infrastructure functionality would be too permissive, effectively giving
States carte blanche to engage in cyber operations— law enforcement and espionage alike—that “merely” involve installing backdoors or monitoring
malware, manipulating or exfiltrating data, or causing temporary loss of functionality. That possibility almost certainly explains why the IGE endorsed a
second category of low-intensity cyber operations that violate sovereignty,
those that interfere with or usurp an inherently governmental function. According to the Manual, such cyber operations are not subject to a de minimis
test; any operation that interferes with or usurps an inherently governmental
function is internationally wrongful. 214
This second category of sovereignty violations, which reflects internal
sovereignty’s governmentality aspect, makes it possible for the IGE to distinguish between law enforcement and espionage, even though both normally involve cyber-activities—particularly the exfiltration of data—that by
design do not cause the kind of physical damage or loss of functionality that
(according to the IGE) violates territorial sovereignty. Cyber operations that
exfiltrate data for law enforcement purposes violate sovereignty because law
enforcement is an inherently governmental function; cyber operations that
exfiltrate the same data for purposes of espionage do not violate sovereignty
because espionage is not an inherently governmental function. Here is what
the Manual says about law enforcement:
With respect to usurpation, the International Group of Experts concurred
that a State may not conduct inherently governmental functions exclusively
reserved to another State on the latter’s territory. An example on point is
the exercise of law enforcement functions within another State’s borders
in the absence of either an allocation of authority under international law
or consent (Rule 11). To illustrate, if one State conducts a law enforcement
214. Id. at 21 (“It matters not whether physical damage, injury, or loss of functionality
has resulted or whether the operation qualifies in accordance with the various differing positions outlined above for operations that do not result in a loss of functionality.”).
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operation against a botnet in order to obtain evidence for criminal prosecution by taking over its command and control servers located in another
State without that State’s consent, the former has violated the latter’s sovereignty because the operation usurps an inherently governmental function
exclusively reserved to the territorial State under international law. 215

The Manual does not specifically argue that espionage does not usurp an
inherently governmental function, but that assumption is implied in its differential treatment of espionage and law enforcement: if espionage did usurp
an inherently governmental function, no de minimis test would apply, and any
extraterritorial act of espionage would violate sovereignty. 216
The distinction between law enforcement and espionage makes sense in
terms of usurpation. As the quote above from the Manual indicates, international law reserves to States the exclusive right to engage in law enforcement
on their territory. The same is not true of espionage: international law does
not affirmatively permit States to engage in espionage at all, at least outside
of armed conflict. Unlike law enforcement, therefore, espionage does not
usurp an inherently governmental function.
The difficulty with the Tallinn Manual’s distinction between law enforcement and espionage is that “usurpation” is not the only basis for a violation
of sovereignty. A State is also prohibited, according to the IGE, from “interfering” with an inherently governmental function. The focus with interference is not on the nature of the cyber operation (law enforcement or espionage) but on whether that cyber operation makes it more difficult for the
territorial State to engage in governmentality. 217
It seems clear that at least some kinds of cyber espionage should violate
sovereignty because they interfere with an inherently governmental function.
Consider, for example, a situation in which a State hacks into another State’s
defense system and steals its nuclear launch codes. According to the Tallinn
Manual, the hacking does not violate the targeted State’s territorial sovereignty because it did not cause physical damage or render the targeted State’s
215. Id. at 22–23.
216. Schmitt has confirmed this interpretation in an e-mail to the author. E-mail from
Michael Schmitt to author, supra note 109.
217. The Tallinn Manual does not define “interference,” despite its centrality to the
IGE’s understanding of sovereignty. The general editor of the Manual, Michael Schmitt,
defines it as “disturb[ing] the territorial State’s ability to perform the functions as it wishes.”
See Michael N. Schmitt, “Virtual” Disenfranchisement: Cyber Election Meddling in the Grey Zones of
International Law, 19 CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 30, 45 (2018).
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cyber infrastructure inoperable. The hacking also does not usurp the targeted
State’s governmental sovereignty because espionage is not an inherently governmental function. But surely the hacking interferes with the targeted State’s
governmental sovereignty? After all, national security is the prototypic governmental function, 218 and the theft of the launch codes makes it possible
for the perpetrator State to disrupt, and perhaps even neutralize, the targeted
State’s nuclear defense capability. A more significant interference is difficult
to imagine.
This analysis is straightforward—yet the Tallinn Manual explicitly rejects
it:
The majority of the Experts was of the view that exfiltration violates no
international law prohibition irrespective of the attendant severity. They
suggested that the legal issue is not severity, but instead whether the
method employed is unlawful. A few Experts took the position that at a
certain point the consequences suffered by the target State are so severe
(e.g., the exfiltration of nuclear launch codes) that the operation is a violation of sovereignty (Rule 4). The majority countered by stating that this
position is not reflective of lex lata. 219

It is a strange view of sovereignty that prohibits a State’s law enforcement officials from hacking into a suspected criminal’s laptop when he is
abroad 220 but permits that same State’s intelligence service to hack into an
enemy’s defense system and steal its nuclear launch codes.
To be sure, it is possible to defend a broader understanding of inherently
governmental functions, one that would effectively prohibit any act of cyber
espionage. A number of States believe that they have the exclusive right to
regulate all cyber-activity that takes place on their territory, what is often

218. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 22 (deeming “the performance of key
national defence activities” an exclusively governmental function).
219. Id. at 171.
220. A violation of sovereignty on usurpation grounds. See id. at 70 (“[I]f a law enforcement agency hacks into a suspected criminal’s computer located in another State, it is exercising enforcement jurisdiction in that State and the activity requires the latter State’s consent or a specific allocation of authority under international law.”).
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referred to as “cyber sovereignty.” China articulates cyber sovereignty—echoed in softer forms by States such as Finland, 221 Germany, 222 and the Netherlands 223—as follows:
National governments are entitled to administer cyberspace in accordance
with law. They exercise jurisdiction over ICT infrastructure, resources and
activities within their territories, and are entitled to protect their ICT systems and resources from threat, disruption, attack and destruction so as to
safeguard citizens’ legitimate rights and interests in cyberspace. National
governments are entitled to enact public policies, laws and regulations with
no foreign interference. 224

If States have the exclusive right “to protect their ICT systems and resources from threat, disruption, attack and destruction,” it is difficult to understand how any act of cyber espionage does not interfere with a State’s
governmental sovereignty. By definition, cyber espionage makes it more difficult for a State to ensure that only legally authorized cyberactivity takes
place on its territory. 225 It is not surprising, therefore, that at least one State—

221. Statement of Finland, supra note 45, at 1 (“While cyberspace as a whole cannot be
subject to appropriation by any State, each State has jurisdiction over the cyber infrastructure and the persons engaged in cyber activities within its territory. Sovereignty confers each
State the exclusive right to exercise the functions of a State within a certain territory.”).
222. Statement of Germany, supra note 2, at 3 (“Within its borders, a State has the
exclusive right—within the framework of international law—to fully exercise its authority,
which includes the protection of cyber activities, persons engaging therein as well as cyber
infrastructures in the territory of a State against cyber and non-cyber-related interferences
attributable to foreign States.”).
223. Statement of the Netherlands, supra note 44, at 2 (“States have exclusive authority
over the physical, human and immaterial (logical or software-related) aspects of cyberspace
within their territory. Within their territory they may, for example, set rules concerning the
technical specifications of mobile networks, cybersecurity and resilience against cyberattacks, take measures to combat cybercrime, and enforce the law with a view to protecting
the confidentiality of personal data.”).
224. DEPARTMENT OF ARMS CONTROL, GOVERNMENT OF PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY OF COOPERATION ON CYBERSPACE 2 (2017),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2017-03/01/c_136094371.htm.
225. Such cyber sovereignty obviously carries with it significant risk of human-rights
abuse regarding privacy, freedom of expression, etc. The exercise of cyber sovereignty is,
however, always limited by prohibitive rules of international law. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0,
supra note 11, at 14 (noting that although “a State may regulate the cyber activities of those

1485

International Law Studies

2021

the Bahamas, in response to NSA surveillance—has denounced cyber espionage as inherently incompatible not only with territorial integrity but also
with “freedom from undue external intrusion and influence.” 226 In fact, Russell Buchan has suggested that the WikiLeaks revelations have “given rise to
state practice which, albeit embryonic, indicates that espionage is being increasingly regarded as impermissible interference with the performance of
governmental functions” and thus violates sovereignty. 227
Debates over the scope of governmental sovereignty matter, however,
only because a number of States and the Tallinn Manual do not endorse the
pure-sovereigntist position, despite it having a much stronger foundation in
general international law than its relative-sovereigntist competitor. If any
low-intensity cyber operation violates territorial sovereignty, including espionage, there is no need to create a special category of non-harmful operations that violate sovereignty because they interfere with or usurp an inherently governmental function.
VI.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The reluctance of States and the Tallinn Manual to adopt the pure-sovereigntist position would be understandable if either of the other positions on sovereignty in cyberspace—sovereignty as a principle or relative sovereignty—
was superior from a policy perspective. But that is not the case.
A. Sovereignty as a Principle
If sovereignty was a principle and not a rule in cyberspace, as the United
Kingdom argues, international law would give States carte blanche to conduct
cyber operations that do not rise to the level of a use of force or prohibited
intervention. 228 In other words, States could conduct any of the low-intensity
on its territory, including both natural and legal persons. . . . State censorship of, or restrictions on, online communications and activities are subject to applicable international
human rights law”).
226. BUCHAN, supra note 16, at 54.
227. Id. at 55.
228. See, e.g., Corn & Taylor, supra note 60, at 210 (“Because the doctrine of sovereignty
does not prevent all actions by one state that affect another state or even ‘encroachment on
other sovereign jurisdictions’, a state involved in operations against ISIS, such as the United
States, is not precluded from taking action against ISIS’s cyber facilities in other states, even
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cyber operations discussed in this article—whether for law enforcement,
counterterrorism, or espionage—without fear of (lawful) retaliation by the
targeted State. 229 As discussed earlier, States are entitled to engage in countermeasures only in response to internationally wrongful acts.
To be sure, the unavailability of countermeasures would not leave a State
targeted by a low-intensity cyber operation powerless to defend itself. The
targeted State would be free to engage in a retaliatory low-intensity cyber
operation of its own. That freedom, however, is not an adequate substitute
for the legal right to engage in countermeasures. Not all States—indeed, relatively few 230—have the technological ability to respond to a low-intensity
cyber operation with a low-intensity cyber operation of their own. For those
that do not, the freedom to engage in counter-cyber operations would be
illusory: they would simply have to tolerate low-intensity cyber operations
that manifest on their territory, law enforcement, counterterrorism, and espionage alike—even when those operations caused physical damage or rendered cyber infrastructure inoperable. International law would only prohibit
other States from targeting them with cyber operations that rose to the level
of a prohibited intervention or use of force
This is why countermeasures are so important for less powerful States:
they do not have to be in kind. A State targeted by a low-intensity cyber
operation that violates its sovereignty does not have to respond with its own
cyber operation; it can engage in any proportionate response to that internationally wrongful act, such as by “denying the state launching [the cyber operation] overflight or landing rights provided for in a respective treaty.” 231
The availability of countermeasures thus ensures that every State, no matter
its technological capability, has both the right and the ability to defend itself
against an unlawful cyber operation.
From a policy perspective, then, sovereignty as a principle is attractive
only for powerful States that want the legal right to engage in offensive lowintensity cyber operations and have the technological capability to defend
themselves against such operations with low-intensity cyber operations of
without the consent of the host state, unless doing so constitutes a prohibited intervention
or use of force.”).
229. See Schmitt, Defense of Sovereignty, supra note 82, at 5.
230. As noted earlier, data compiled by the Council on Foreign Relations indicates that
only thirty-four States have engaged in low-intensity cyber-operations over the past sixteen
years. See Cyber-Operations Tracker, supra note 9.
231. Schmitt, Defense of Sovereignty, supra note 82, at 6.
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their own. 232 For less technologically sophisticated States, or for States that
are simply in favor of greater regulation of cyberspace by international law,
that position makes little sense. It is thus not surprising that so few States
have endorsed the sovereignty-as-a-principle position—or that some States,
such as Finland, have specifically condemned it. 233
It is also worth noting that even technologically sophisticated States have
reason to endorse sovereignty as a rule. The first reason is reputational: as
Schmitt notes, “[s]tates that do not intend to conduct offensive cyber operations or see themselves as likely victims will understandably perceive the
approach as threatening, particularly if espoused by states wielding substantial cyber capability.” 234 The second reason is more pragmatic. Advocates of
sovereignty as a principle often invoke the need for States like the United
States to be able to engage in counterterrorism on the territory of hostile
States without fear of lawful countermeasures. Leaving low-intensity cyber
operations unregulated by international law, however, empowers all States
with offensive capability—not just those who will ostensibly use their power
wisely:
While fighting terrorist groups like ISIS is a laudable policy objective from
both a domestic and international security perspective, the principle of sovereign equality means that such a justification will be equally available to all
other states. Thus, the proposition that cyber operations on foreign soil are
permissible if undertaken to counter terrorist activities . . . could open the
door to other states’ cyber operations against U.S. cyber infrastructure, for
understandings of what the term “terrorism” denotes differ dramatically.
For example, China’s 2015 counterterrorism legislation provides an openended definition of terrorism that could extend to nonviolent dissident activities and certain exercises of speech. If the United States justifies unilateral actions in foreign cyber infrastructure on the basis of counterterrorism,
it is reasonable to assume that other states will feel entitled to do the same,
and may use expansive definitions in doing so. 235
232. Efrony & Shany, supra note 19, at 648–49 (pointing out that “[o]ptionality is particularly relevant for those states that have the greatest capacity to operate covertly in cyberspace and to protect their national security interests outside the framework of international
law”).
233. See Statement of Finland, supra note 45, at 3 (condemning the position because
“[a]greeing that a hostile cyber operation below the threshold of prohibited intervention
cannot amount to an internationally wrongful act would leave such operations un-regulated
and deprive the target State of an important opportunity to claim its rights”).
234. Schmitt, Defense of Sovereignty, supra note 82, at 7.
235. Schmitt & Vihul, Sovereignty in Cyberspace, supra note 8, at 217.
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Needless to say, a counterterrorism cyber-free-for-all is hardly conducive to
international peace and security.
B. Sovereignty as a Rule
Every State, in short, has an interest in promoting the idea that sovereignty
applies in cyberspace as a rule, not as a principle. The question is which position they should endorse: pure sovereignty or relative sovereignty. As explained earlier, because both categorically prohibit low-intensity cyber operations that involve extraterritorial law enforcement (including counterterrorism), the critical difference between them is the legality of cyber espionage:
whereas the pure-sovereigntist position deems all cyber espionage a violation
of sovereignty, the relative-sovereigntist position permits cyber espionage as
long as it is not harmful.
Which position to endorse depends on whether a State wants the freedom to engage in cyber espionage. If a State does not want that freedom—
whether out of principle or (more likely) because it lacks the technological
ability—pure sovereignty is obviously the more desirable position: any act of
cyber espionage will be an internationally wrongful act that entitles the State
to respond with proportionate countermeasures. The pure-sovereigntist position thus maximizes a State’s ability to defend itself against cyber espionage—and likely helps deter cyber espionage in general because would-be
perpetrator States will have no “grey zone” concerning the legality of a particular operation to exploit. 236
For the same reasons, a State that wants to engage in cyber espionage
and has the requisite technological ability should prefer the relative-sovereigntist position. That position would permit the State to engage in cyber
espionage as long as it avoided causing physical damage or rendering cyber
infrastructure inoperable. And although the State would lose the right to engage in countermeasures against non-harmful cyber espionage that targeted
its computer systems, it would still have the freedom to respond to such
cyber espionage with low-intensity cyber operations of its own.

236. See Michael N. Schmitt, “Grey Zones” in the International Law of Cyberspace, 42 YALE
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 21 (2017) (“Certitude that a cyber operation can risk
consequences at a set level can deter the taking of that operation, because the State concerned cannot act in the hope that the target State will hesitate to respond out of concern
that its response might be viewed as unlawful.”).
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The relative-sovereigntist position would thus seem particularly attractive for technologically sophisticated States that respect international law.
Those States would presumably be uninterested in engaging in cyber espionage that causes physical damage to the territorial State or renders its cyber
infrastructure inoperable. Their interest would lie in non-harmful forms of
cyber espionage, such as the NSA surveillance revealed by WikiLeaks: monitoring communications, exfiltrating information, deleting or amending data.
For them, relative sovereignty would appear to strike the perfect balance between offense and defense—neither too restrictive nor too permissive. 237
That said, even States with the ability to engage in cyber espionage have
reason to prefer an international legal regime that categorically prohibits, and
thus helps deter, such espionage even when it is not harmful. Simply put,
many types of “harmless” cyber espionage—both public and private—pose
a threat to even the most powerful and technologically sophisticated States.
This is most obvious in terms of espionage against corporations. It is
uncontroversial that a State’s territorial sovereignty extends to both private
and public cyber infrastructure, 238 and there may well be acts of cyber espionage that satisfy the relative-sovereigntist position by causing significant
harm to private cyber infrastructure. 239 An example is the Shamoon 1 malware attack on Saudi Aramco mentioned earlier, widely attributed to Iran,
which wiped out the memory of at least 30,000 computers. Not only was

237. See, e.g., Moynihan, supra note 8, at 23 (“An approach based on quantitative and/or
qualitative effects in the target state, or some other form of de minimis threshold, is attractive
from a practical and pragmatic point of view as it enables states to take action in relation to
cyber intrusions that may not reach the threshold of intervention but that nevertheless cause
harmful effects within the territory.”).
238. See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 13–14 (“With respect to a State’s
internal sovereignty, it is irrelevant as a matter of international law whether the cyber infrastructure in question is public or private in character, or whether the cyber activities concerned are engaged in by the State’s organs or by private individuals or entities.”); Buchan,
supra note 17, at 183 (“State practice reveals that States consider their sovereignty to extend
to information in cyberspace which belongs to government institutions and to private entities and individuals over which they exercise jurisdiction.”).
239. Some private cyber-espionage might even violate the principle of non-intervention. Moynihan suggests as much for the distributed denial of service attacks, attributed to
Iran, that targeted the entire U.S. financial sector between 2011 and 2013. See Moynihan,
supra note 8, at 39.
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Saudi Aramco’s entire computer network inoperable for ten days, it needed
months to replace all of the affected systems. 240
Most private cyber espionage, however, will not cause physical damage
or equivalent loss of cyber infrastructure functionality. As Djabatey points
out, “the creation of a backdoor to access commercial or technological information is unlikely to be of a scale equivalent to the emplacement of malware capable of significantly impairing or damaging critical infrastructure.” 241
Consider the examples mentioned in the introduction to this article: China’s
theft of intellectual property from Lockheed-Martin in 2009 and Google in
2010; Iran’s hacking of universities in the United States, United Kingdom,
Australia, and other States between 2016 and 2019. 242 Or consider the Flame
virus, believed to be the work of the United States and Israel, which targeted
Iranian oil companies and had the ability to “activate computer microphones
and cameras, log keyboard strokes, take screenshots, extract geolocation
from images, and send and receive commands and data through Bluetooth
wireless technology.” 243 The pure-sovereigntist position would deem all of
these acts of private cyber espionage internationally wrongful simply because
they involved penetrating computer systems located on another State’s territory. But they would be entirely lawful under the relative-sovereigntist position because they did not harm the computer systems from which the information was exfiltrated.
Private cyber espionage is extraordinarily costly. The IP Commission Report, for example, states that the theft of intellectual property from American
companies alone amounts to “hundreds of billions of dollars per year.” 244 It
seems safe to assume that, as a general rule, law-abiding States are far less
likely to engage in private cyber espionage than lawless ones. Law-abiding
States thus have little incentive to accept a conception of sovereignty that
does not deem private cyber espionage internationally wrongful and thereby
prohibits them from taking countermeasures against the responsible State.
Yet, that is precisely what the relative-sovereigntist position does.
240. Efrony & Shany, supra note 19, at 621. Schmitt argues persuasively that “the 2012
cyber operations against Saudi Aramco necessitated the replacement of affected computers
and therefore, if conducted by another State as is suspected, amounted to a violation of
sovereignty even though the systems suffered no physical damage.” Schmitt, “Virtual” Disenfranchisement, supra note 217, at 44.
241. Djabatey, supra note 203, at 5.
242. See, e.g., Moynihan, supra note 8, at 3.
243. Buchan, supra note 17, at 169.
244. Quoted in Lotrionte, supra note 197, at 451.
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The policy calculus is more complicated for public cyber espionage, because the relative-sovereigntist position prohibits low-intensity cyber operations that interfere with or usurp inherently governmental functions regardless of whether they cause harm. Properly understood, that aspect of internal
sovereignty should prohibit much, if not all, public cyber espionage. Insofar
as States follow the Tallinn Manual’s curious approach to “interference,”
however, the relative-sovereigntist position—unlike its pure-sovereigntist
competitor—will tolerate at least some public-cyber espionage. Consider, for
example, the United States’ “Cyber Pearl Harbor,” in which China allegedly
hacked the Office of Personnel Management and stole the personal data of
millions of past and present government employees. It is difficult to see how
that act of cyber espionage violated relative sovereignty, given that it did not
harm the accessed computer systems. Dan Efrony and Yuval Shany believe
the theft likely “had short-term adverse consequences for counterintelligence
activities and compromised the safety of American intelligence agents operating abroad.” 245 But even so, if stealing nuclear launch codes doesn’t interfere with an inherently governmental function, surely stealing personnel information from a government computer system doesn’t either.
Other notorious acts of public cyber espionage also avoid running afoul
of the relative-sovereigntist position. For example, Russia’s Solar Winds operation planted backdoors in the computer systems of a variety of U.S. government agencies (as well as in corporate computer systems) that “allowed
them to come and go, steal data and . . . alter data or conduct destructive
attacks.” 246 Then-president-elect Biden described Solar Winds as a “cyber
assault” and vowed “not to stand idly by” 247—yet Schmitt concludes, applying the Tallinn Manual’s rules, that the operation did not violate U.S. sovereignty. 248
Proponents of the relative-sovereigntist position—States and scholars
alike—never explain why any State would want to tolerate these kinds of
public cyber espionage. The U.S. reluctance to endorse pure sovereignty
245. Efrony & Shany, supra note 19, at 601.
246. David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, Trump Contradicts Pompeo over Russia’s Role in
Hack, NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/19/us/
trump-contradicts-pompeo-over-russias-role-in-hack.html.
247. Statement by President-elect Joe Biden on Cybersecurity, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
PROJECT (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-president-elect-joe-biden-cybersecurity.
248. Michael Schmitt, Top Expert Backgrounder: Russia’s SolarWinds Operation and International Law, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/73946/russias-solarwinds-operation-and-international-law/.
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might be somewhat understandable, because it does not have to “stand idly
by” in the face of cyber espionage like Solar Winds if it cannot engage in
countermeasures: given its technological sophistication, the United States
will almost always be able to retaliate with a far more effective low-intensity
cyber operation of its own. Once critical information is stolen through espionage, however, counter-espionage cannot unsteal it. All a State like the
United States can do is punish the responsible State, hoping to deter it from
engaging in similar acts in the future.
That potential response might be sufficient to justify relative sovereignty
if the threat of retaliation would be more likely to deter public cyber espionage than the threat of countermeasures. But that is almost certainly not the
case. A cyber operation launched in response to lawful public cyber espionage would have to remain within the limits imposed by international law.
That means it could not involve a use of force against the targeted State,
could not intervene in the targeted State’s internal affairs, could not damage
or render inoperable the targeted State’s cyber infrastructure, and could not
usurp or interfere with the targeted State’s inherently governmental functions. The deterrent value created by the threat of such retaliation would thus
likely be limited—particularly in contrast to the threat of countermeasures,
which could involve any proportionate response to the public cyber espionage, including responses in the physical world.
Moreover, few States have the U.S.’s cyber capabilities. For States that
cannot credibly threaten cyber retaliation, the relative-sovereigntist position
removes the one deterrent and the one potentially effective response they
have against cyber espionage. They simply have to accept non-harmful cyber
espionage, public and private. Indeed, they must accept it even when nonharmful cyber espionage has the potential to become extremely damaging
later on—such as Operation Nitro Zeus, which involved “the US penetrating deeply into Iran’s infrastructure before the 2015 nuclear accord [and]
placing digital ‘implants’ in systems that would enable it to bring down power
grids, command-and-control systems and other infrastructure in case a conflict broke out.” 249 According to the relative-sovereigntist position, Iran had
no right to engage in countermeasures unless and until the United States
decided to activate the digital implants and actually caused physical damage
or equivalent loss of cyber infrastructure functionality. That is a problematic
249. Cyberattacks Put Russian Fingers on the Switch at Power Plants, U.S. Says, CYBERSECUOBSERVATORY (March 16, 2018), https://www.cybersecobservatory.com/2018/03/
16/cyberattacks-put-russian-fingers-switch-power-plants-u-s-says/.
RITY
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limitation 250—akin to prohibiting the police from arresting a suspect who is
pointing a gun at someone until he pulls the trigger.
To be sure, some scholars have argued that tolerating public espionage
promotes international peace and security. 251 Christopher Baker, for example, adopts a “functionalist” defense of espionage, claiming that it enables
States “to better appreciate their partners’ negotiating positions,” thereby
encouraging “strategic dialogue,” 252 and functions as “a tool that enables ‘super-validation’ of international compliance with security agreements.” 253 He
thus concludes that espionage’s supposed permissibility means that “a
heightened level of international cooperation is achieved.” 254
Baker’s argument is not convincing. It is difficult to understand how international peace and security are promoted by China stealing plans for the
F-35 fighter from Lockheed-Martin, Russia planting backdoors in the computer systems of critical U.S. government agencies, or the United States systematically intercepting the private communications of its allies, including
their heads of State. Indeed, the Brazilian president’s response to the NSA
surveillance in front of the General Assembly—made after she canceled an
important visit to Washington—provides the most powerful rebuttal to
Baker: “Friendly governments and societies that seek to consolidate a truly
strategic partnership, such as is our case, cannot possibly allow recurring and
illegal actions to go on as if they were normal, ordinary practice. Such actions
are totally unacceptable.” 255 Insofar as States care about international peace
and security, therefore, they should oppose the legality of all public cyber
espionage—which means endorsing the pure-sovereigntist position.
C. The Problem of Ambiguity
In short, all but the most lawless States have no incentive to engage in, much
less tolerate, private or public cyber espionage. Moreover, even if law-abiding
States are inclined to maintain some legal freedom to engage in offensive
250. Cf. Roguski, Violations of Territorial Sovereignty, supra note 149, at 76 (noting that “this
freedom to act . . . in effect create[s] a freedom to install malware on foreign computer
systems”).
251. See Buchan, supra note 17, at 174–77.
252. Christopher D. Baker, Tolerance of International Espionage: A Functional Approach, 19
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 1091, 1104 (2003).
253. Id. at 1108.
254. Id. at 1113.
255. Quoted in Buchan, supra note 17, at 178.
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cyber espionage, the practical utility of the relative-sovereigntist position is
undermined by three important ambiguities.
The first ambiguity is the most obvious: no one—not States, not scholars—is quite sure where the red line is or should be drawn between lowintensity cyber operations that violate a State’s territorial sovereignty and
low-intensity cyber operations that do not. Proponents of relative sovereignty agree at the margins: it is lawful for a cyber operation to merely penetrate a computer system or exfiltrate information; it is unlawful for a cyber
operation to cause physical damage or equivalent loss of cyber infrastructure
functionality. Between the margins, however, lies a significant “grey zone”
of uncertainty. 256 Some States, like New Zealand, endorse relative sovereignty without even attempting to establish a red line. Others, like the Netherlands, follow the Tallinn Manual. And still others adopt their own idiosyncratic tests, from permitting cyber operations that have no more than “negligible physical effects” (Germany) to prohibiting those that cause “material
harm” (Finland).
The German and Finnish tests are ambiguous, and the Dutch position is
even less helpful. As discussed earlier, the IGE did not rule out the possibility
of cyber operations violating territorial sovereignty despite not causing physical damage or equivalent loss of cyber infrastructure functionality. Instead,
according to Schmitt, the director of the project, the Experts offered a “confusing mélange of views” on the appropriate test, making it “impossible to
draw definitive red lines.” 257 Moreover, all of the Experts justified their views
by reference to the object and purpose of sovereignty, 258 making it clear that
any attempt to harmonize the various versions of the relative-sovereigntist
position would be unlikely to succeed.
The second ambiguity concerns the other aspect of the relative-sovereigntist position: governmentality. At first glance, that aspect appears easier
to apply because States have generally endorsed the Tallinn Manual’s position
that no de minimis test applies to low-intensity cyber operations that interfere
with or usurp inherently governmental functions. The problem is that, as the
Manual openly acknowledges, the IGE could not “definitively” identify
which functions should be considered inherently governmental. 259 Instead,

256. The helpful term is Schmitt’s. See generally Schmitt, “Virtual” Disenfranchisement, supra
note 217.
257. Id. at 45.
258. Id.
259. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 11, at 22.
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the Experts simply offered a few indicative examples of such functions, leaving it to States to further develop governmentality through their practice and
opinio juris.
Relative sovereignty’s third ambiguity concerns the distinction between
law enforcement and non-harmful espionage. As we have seen, the relativesovereigntist position draws a hard line between the two: law enforcement
always violates the territorial State’s sovereignty because it usurps an inherently governmental function; non-harmful espionage never does because espionage is unregulated by international law. As Jennifer Daskal notes, however, because law enforcement and espionage are distinguished more by purpose than by method, it can be extremely difficult in practice to categorize a
specific low-intensity cyber operation:
[S]uch a purpose-based test will be almost impossible to implement. It assumes a clear-cut division of intelligence and law enforcement operations
that can easily be discerned, where in practice the lines between intelligence
gathering and law enforcement are often blurred. Moreover, even when
there are relatively clear-cut divisions between law enforcement and intelligence operations, information obtained for one purpose may ultimately
be shared and used for another. In such situations, how does one assess
purpose? Based on the entity that did the information gathering—an easily
manipulated factor? Based on how it is ultimately used—a consideration
that raises all kinds of practical complexities, given the inevitable and perhaps lengthy time lag between collection and use? 260

The Tallinn Manual openly acknowledges that “it can be challenging for
a target State to distinguish cyber espionage activities from other cyber operations.” 261 But instead of questioning the validity of the distinction, the
IGE simply punted the issue, insisting—without explanation—that “this dilemma” can be resolved “by the various requirements regarding certainty
that apply with respect to State responses to cyber operations.” 262
If the relative-sovereigntist position wins out, the grey zones created by
these three ambiguities will make it highly likely, if not unavoidable, that
States will clash over both the legality of specific low-intensity cyber operations and the legality of countermeasures taken in response to them. As
260. Jennifer Daskal, Transnational Government Hacking, 10 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SE-

CURITY LAW AND POLICY 677, 689 (2020).
261. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note

262. Id. at 173.

11, at 172.
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Schmitt points out, “[r]esolution of this quandary through State practice and
opinio juris is likely to take time; until then, hostile non-injurious or non-destructive cyber operations conducted into other States’ territory will benefit
from the uncertainties surrounding the legal concept of a sovereignty violation.” 263 And Schmitt is likely being overly optimistic: if the forty scholars in
the IGE could not agree on fundamental cyber sovereignty concepts such as
“de minimis” and “inherently governmental function,” it beggars belief to
think that 193 States will be able to do so.
Even worse, the relative-sovereigntist position’s grey zones will almost
certainly be exploited more often by technologically sophisticated States than
by States that are less technologically capable. Most States simply lack the
ability to exploit those grey zones through offensive cyber operations, as indicated by the fact that only thirty-four States have conducted such operations since 2005, with the vast majority—77 percent—being the work of just
four States: China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. 264 But even States that do
have offensive capabilities will be asymmetrically affected by relative sovereignty’s ambiguities, because most will be deterred by the threat of a targeted
State applying a different understanding of de minimis or inherently governmental function and engaging in countermeasures. 265 Powerful States might
be able to weather countermeasures “wrongly” imposed. For the less powerful, such countermeasures could prove calamitous.
It is not surprising, then, that Efrony and Shany have found that “several
States that are heavily engaged in cyberoperations appear at this point in time
to have a limited interest in promoting legal certainty regarding the regulation
of cyberspace” 266—particularly Russia, China, and the United States. Simply
put, ambiguity favors the strong. All other States have a compelling interest

263. Schmitt, “Virtual” Disenfranchisement, supra note 217, at 6–7.
264. See Cyber-Operations Tracker, supra note 9.
265. See Moynihan, supra note 8, at 20 (“International law must be applied objectively,
rather than sovereignty simply meaning whatever a state says it is, but the lack of any specific
criteria for violations increases the risk of states interpreting sovereignty subjectively.”).
266. Efrony & Shany, supra note 19, at 585.
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in endorsing a conception of sovereignty that is clearer and more administrable 267—namely, the pure-sovereigntist position. 268 As Schmitt says, “legal
clarity breeds international stability. The brighter the red-lines of international law as applied to cyber activities, the less opportunity States will have
to exploit grey zones in ways that create instability.” 269
VII.

CONCLUSION

Chircop has described the legal status of low-intensity cyber operations—
those that do not violate either the prohibition of the use of force or the
principle of non-intervention—as the “foremost” controversy concerning
how international law applies in cyberspace. 270 That description seems warranted, given how deeply divided States are over the question of when such
operations violate sovereignty and permit the targeted State to engage in
countermeasures.
This article has considered the three positions States have taken on that
issue. It has rejected out of hand the idea, consistently defended only by the
United Kingdom, that low-intensity cyber operations never violate sovereignty because sovereignty functions in cyberspace as a principle, not as a
rule. That idea is simply irreconcilable with the nature of international law
and with overwhelming State practice and opinio juris to the contrary.
The real choice is between the pure-sovereigntist position and the relative-sovereigntist position, both of which view sovereignty as a rule that applies in cyberspace. According to the former, all low-intensity cyber operations violate sovereignty because sovereignty prohibits any non-consensual
penetration of a computer system located on the territory of another State.
According to the latter, only some low-intensity cyber operations violate the
sovereignty of the targeted State—those that either (1) cause physical damage or equivalent loss of cyber infrastructure functionality, or (2) interfere
with or usurp inherently governmental functions. In practice, the difference
267. Cf. Moynihan, supra note 8, at 4–5 “(States that are the victim of cyberattacks by
other states need to be able to identify which rules of international law have been breached
in order to know what action they are permitted to take in response, including whether they
are entitled to take countermeasures.”).
268. See Roguski, Violations of Territorial Sovereignty, supra note 149, at 80 (noting that, in
contrast to relative sovereignty, pure sovereignty provides “a familiar, less ambiguous and
more viable tool for assessing violations of sovereignty in cyberspace”).
269. Schmitt, “Virtual” Disenfranchisement, supra note 217, at 21.
270. Chircop, supra note 10, at 2.
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between the two positions concerns cyber espionage, which pure sovereignty
categorically prohibits and relative sovereignty generally permits.
Very few scholars have explicitly defended the pure-sovereigntist position, most likely because of the influence of the Tallinn Manual, which leans
toward relative sovereignty. Similarly, while ten States can safely be categorized as endorsing some version of pure sovereignty, only three have explicitly adopted that position—France, Iran, and Switzerland—and none have
defended it at any length.
This article has endeavored to fill that lacuna, arguing that the pure-sovereigntist position is superior to its relative-sovereigntist competitor both as
a matter of law and as a matter of policy. In terms of law, it has shown that
pure sovereignty represents the natural application of the first Lotus principle
in the cyber realm, while relative sovereignty represents a significant deviation from that principle—one unsupported either by convention or by custom. In terms of policy, it has shown that no State, not even the most powerful, has a compelling reason to reserve the right to engage in non-harmful
public or private cyber espionage. Permitting cyber espionage is not only
likely to cause them economic harm, it is an invitation to international instability.
The choice between the pure-sovereigntist position and the relative-sovereigntist position, therefore, is not much of a choice at all. All States, the
powerful no less than the weak, have reason to endorse an international law
of cyberspace based on pure sovereignty.
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